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PALLIATIVE CARE IN THE U.S. 

HEALTHCARE SYSTEM: CONSTITUTIONAL 

RIGHT OR CRIMINAL ACT? 

STEPHEN ARONS* 
INTRODUCTION 
We live in increasingly polarized times, in which science, pro­
fessional expertise, pragmatism, common sense, and even human 
empathy are more and more becoming the acceptable collateral 
damage of the culture wars. The provision of healthcare-and the 
legal and policy contexts in which it is available-has not been im­
mune from this corrosive process. Where once there was a rough­
hewn but functional consensus governing the individual's right to 
make private decisions about his or her own medical care, we now 
have often intemperate and ill-informed public struggle. In this 
new world of blind certainty, it is all too common to see family 
members, patients, physicians, and other healthcare workers pitted 
against each other, and to find that the most complex, difficult, and 
intimate family and individual decisions about the dying process are 
being transformed into grist for the political and ideological mills. 
For over a quarter of a century, a general consensus has existed 
among physicians, healthcare experts, and biomedical ethicists that 
competent patients have the right to refuse unwanted medical care, 
even life-sustaining care, and to secure their autonomy in these 
matters through advance directives that become effective upon the 
loss of legal competence.1 Much of today's relevant healthcare law 
* Stephen Arons, J.D., Harvard University, 1969, is Professor of Legal Studies at 
the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. In the extended period of thinking through, 
researching, drafting, and editing this article, the author wishes to acknowledge the in­
valuable assistance of Barbara Noah, Barbara Morgan, Brynn Rovito, Lew Cohen, 
Kathryn Tucker, Zita Lazzarini, my colleagues on the End of Life Care Certificate Pro­
gram faculty at the Smith College School for Social Work, my colleagues in the Legal 
Studies Department, and Maggie Solis and the rest of the able editors of the Western 
New England Law Review. 
1. See, e.g., PAUL ApPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND 
CLINICAL PRACTICE (1987); Alan Meisel, Legal Aspects of End-of-Life Decision Mak­
ing, in END-OF-LIFE DECISIONS: A PSYCHOSOCIAL PERSPECTIVE (Maurice D. Steinberg 
& Stuart J. Younger eds., 1998); Norman L. Cantor, On Hastening Death Without Vio­
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is based on and has reinforced this consensus. At the heart of the 
consensus is the principle of individual autonomy-the idea that an 
individual has the right to make decisions about his or her own 
medical care, with all that implies about one's own sense of self, 
one's values and family relationships, and one's beliefs about the 
meaning of life and death. 
The provision of palliative care to the terminally ill-including 
adequate pain management, the assistance of a physician in provid­
ing relief from other forms of physical suffering that often accom­
pany dying, and the privacy of the doctor-patient-family 
relationship-is an essential element of this consensus about a per­
son's right to make decisions about his or her medical treatment. 
Palliative care is often the alternative to treatment for the termi­
nally ill when such treatment is not available or has lost its efficacy. 
Palliative care becomes a necessity when a patient, exercising the 
right to refuse treatment or to have treatment withdrawn, decides 
that even life-sustaining medical intervention is no longer desired. 
The choice of palliative care is itself an expression of the autonomy 
principle in medicine. Without the availability of palliative care, 
end-of-life choices for many of us and our families can become not 
simply difficult and heart-wrenching, but impossibly cruel. This re­
ality raises the question: what might the content of a right to pallia­
tive care be, and by what process might such a right be defined as a 
matter of law, medicine, and ethics?2 
laling Legal and Moral Prohibitions, 37 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 407 (2006); Lawrence O. 
Gostin, Ethics, the Constitution and the Dying Process: The Case of Theresa Marie Schi· 
avo, 293 JAMA 2403 (2005) [hereinafter Gostin, Ethics, the Constitution and the Dying 
Process]; Richard S. Kay, Causing Death for Compassionate Reasons in American Law, 
54 AM. J. COMPo L. 693,697-98 (2006). 
2. Work has already been done that suggests some content and questions about 
the meaning of palliative care and about what a right to it might include. At bottom, 
palliative care is a medical concept and should be defined by medical standards. A 
legislatively created right to palliative care would largely be a matter of policy based 
upon standard medical practice. But the over-arching issue in defining the ambit of a 
right to palliative care is a constitutional one-how much of the content of palliative 
care is a matter of individual liberty and must therefore be left to individuals to deter­
mine in consultation with their physicians and without undue burdens imposed by the 
state? Access for the terminally ill to a doctor's assistance in easing the dying process 
involves a whole range of palliative care practices that physicians routinely provide to 
patients who have refused medical treatment or who have had life-sustaining interven­
tions such as artificial respiration or food and hydration withdrawn. Professor Burt's 
analysis of Glucksberg includes in the concept of palliative care the alleviation of pain 
and "other physical symptoms of people facing death." See infra note 79 and accompa­
nying text. Several of the Justices in Glucksberg observed that the provision of pain 
relief to the terminally ill could be a necessary part of palliative care even when such 
medication hastens an inevitable death. See infra notes 88 & 118 and accompanying 
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The right to refuse treatment and the availability of palliative 
care are inextricably intertwined. The attempt to think about one 
without thinking about the other is a formula for making bad law 
and bad policy, and for increasing human suffering. But the con­
sensus that supports the right to make these intertwined decisions 
about our own medical care is now threatened. A number of doc­
tors and nurses have been subjected to criminal accusations, mal­
practice suits, or investigation by medical or nursing boards for 
providing palliative care or for following a patient's expressed 
wishes to terminate unwanted life-sustaining or death-prolonging 
treatment.3 The Attorney General of the United States sought to 
text. When pain management involves the risk of hastening death-the rule of double 
effect-there is debate about its role in palliative care. That debate may encompass the 
practice of terminal sedation as part of palliative care. See infra notes 78 & 87 and 
accompanying text. 
The Quill case suggests another issue in defining palliative care. Vacco v. Quill, 
521 U.S. 793 (1997). In Quill, the plaintiff and other physicians in New York claimed 
that terminally ill patients not on life support should have physician assistance available 
to them just as terminally ill patients who are on life support have it available to them in 
eaSing and hastening their deaths. The Court refused to accept that equal-protection 
argument, calling the former physician-assisted suicide and the latter refusal of medical 
treatment; but this aspect of the medical and ethical issue of what constitutes palliative 
care is not necessarily resolved by the Court's distinctions in Quill. A number of other 
end-of-life palliative care practices may be more easily accepted. See Cantor, supra 
note 1. Palliative-care physicians have also provided some guidelines for what consti­
tutes adequate palliative care. See, e.g., NAT'L CONSENSUS PROJECf FOR QUALITY 
PALLIATIVE CARE, CLINICAL PRACfICE GUIDELINES FOR QUALITY PALLIATIVE CARE 
(2004), available at http://www.nationalconsensusproject.org/guideline.pdf. 
Social workers, often the meditative force in family and healthcare decision-mak­
ing at the end of life, have considerable experience and wisdom to impart about pallia­
tive care. See LIVING WITH DYING (Joan Berzoff & Phyllis R. Silverman eds., 2004). A 
number of other physician and social work organizations, ethicists, advocacy groups, 
legal cases, and public controversies can be read as indicating what the content of a 
right to palliative care-whether created judicially or legislatively-might contain. See, 
e.g., infra Part IV (discussing the four aspects of the attack on palliative care and on the 
right to refuse treatment). For a discussion of end-of-life care in general, see generally 
HASTINGS CTR., IMPROVING END OF LIFE CARE: WHY HAS IT BEEN SO DIFFICULT? 
(Bruce Jennings et al. eds., 2005), available at http://www.mywhatever.com/cifwriter/ 
content/3/files/hastings_improvin~eoI3are.pdf. Perhaps the most complete and useful 
answer to the question of what the content of a right to palliative care should include is 
contained in the answer to the question of what process should be employed to study, 
construct, and promote such a right. One of the purposes of this Article is to suggest 
that a multi-disciplinary, well organized, and urgent project be mounted to bring 
medicine, ethics, and law together in constructing a right to palliative care that would 
address the real needs of all of us. See infra Conclusion. 
3. The term usually used is "life-sustaining" treatment; in many circumstances, 
treatment that sustains life is a prelude to the saving of life. But in many other cases, 
the growth of advanced medical technology has made that term inaccurate, for real 
treatment may be unavailing and advanced technology may simply prolong a painful 
and unavoidable death. I have added the term "death-prolonging" treatment in order 
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upend Oregon's Death with Dignity Act by issuing an order that 
would have exposed every physician in the nation to the chilling 
possibility of a Drug Enforcement Administration hearing about 
the physician's intent in prescribing Schedule II Controlled Sub­
stances Act (CSA) drugs for pain relief.4 The U.S. Congress and 
many individual state legislatures are presently considering legisla­
tion that would have the effect of chilling the practice of palliative 
care medicine, crimping the use of advance directives, and under­
mining the autonomy principle in medical care for millions of 
Americans. Even the principle of individual autonomy itself-the 
liberty that lies at the heart of constitutional democracy in 
America-is being deconstructed as part of efforts to promote be­
neficent paternalism or to advance concepts of the meaning of life 
held by various religious or interest groups. Perhaps the most dis­
turbing example of this phenomenon is a section of the 2005 report 
of the President's Council on Bioethics, which claims that because 
illness often deprives patients of autonomy near the end of life, 
medical decisions should be made by families and physicians rather 
than by advance directives created when a patient is autonomous.S 
This Article examines the current legal status of the right of 
terminally ill and other patients to refuse unwanted medical treat­
ment and to secure adequate palliative care. It discusses several 
legal, political, and cultural attacks on the availability of palliative 
care, on the principle of autonomy in advance directives, and on the 
right to refuse treatment. It observes that the practice of medicine 
and the relationships among doctors, patients, and families are in­
creasingly politicized by these attacks. It also considers the possi­
bility that a right to palliative care might be found in the 
Constitution or be created by state legislatures. Finally, the Article 
concludes that the legal status of these rights is more tenuous than 
is generally assumed and that we are in the midst of a broad effort 
to de-legitimize some of the most basic assumptions that Americans 
hold about their medical care. Tenuous liberty rights and an active 
cultural and political struggle have created a polarizing socio-Iegal 
flux. The strange possibility therefore exists that, in the United 
States, depending on the outcome of this struggle, the refusal of 
unwanted medical treatment and the provision of adequate pallia­
to acknowledge the reality that confronts many such terminally ill people and their 
families. 
4. Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607 (In­
terpretive Rule, Nov. 9,2001). 
5. See infra note 139 and accompanying text. 
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tive care to the terminally ill in the future could be regarded either 
as matters of individual right or as the commission of criminal acts. 
A central theme of this Article is that only the former is acceptable 
in a humane democracy, and that the current conditions of law, cul­
ture, and medicine create not only the opportunity but also the 
need to define a right to palliative care. 
Much of what follows concerns the right to refuse treatment, 
on the assumption that refusing or withdrawing treatment is often a 
necessary part of, or precursor to, palliative care. Part I uses the 
Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health 6 case to present the per­
sonal, cultural, and political context of a struggle over the right to 
refuse medical treatment. Part II discusses the legal and constitu­
tional status of the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, also 
through an analysis of the Cruzan case. Part III examines the right 
to refuse treatment in the context of providing palliative care for 
the terminally ill; or for those whose illnesses or conditions will 
cause their deaths if they decline medical treatment. It moves from 
the realities and legal doctrine of Cruzan to the discussion of end­
of-life issues in Washington v. Glucksberg7 and Vacco v. Quill.s 
Part IV describes and evaluates some of the main legal and policy 
actions that threaten the quarter-century consensus about the ap­
propriateness of an individual controlling his or her medical treat­
ment. The Conclusion suggests that the future of a thoughtful, 
effective, and ethical set of policies about the right to refuse treat­
ment and the provision of palliative care for the terminally ill and 
others depends upon backing away from the overbearing self-right­
eousness of the culture wars and acknowledging that end-of-life de­
cisions touch upon the most basic and intimate views of life and 
death in a diverse nation. The Conclusion also urges that we bring 
to bear upon the task of guaranteeing adequate palliative care as a 
matter of right, the already considerable resources of law, medicine, 
ethics, and our individual experiences with this unfortunately com­
mon dilemma. 
I. 	 THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT: THE 
CONTEXT OF THE CRUZAN CASE 
The right to refuse medical treatment, even life-sustaining 
medical treatment, has been a fact of legal life for over seventy-five 
6. Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
7. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
8. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
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years. At its inception in 1914, in Justice Cardozo's opinion in the 
case of Schloendorftv. Society ofNew York Hospital,9 an individual 
was entitled to be free of unwanted and unconsented touching by a 
physician under the law of battery. Growing out of an intentional 
tort, the right to refuse medical treatment included the requirement 
that a patient give his or her informed consent to a medical proce­
dure. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the right to re­
fuse medical treatment also found a basis in the United States 
Constitution, with courts referring to either a privacy interest or a 
liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause.lO At the core of both common law and constitutional con­
ceptions of the right has been the principle of individual autonomy. 
Justice Cardozo put it this way: "Every human being of adult years 
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with 
his own body."ll Seventy-six years later, in the Cruzan case, Justice 
O'Connor filled out the concept of autonomy using the language of 
constitutional liberty: 
The State's imposition of medical treatment on an unwilling com­
petent adult necessarily involves some form of restraint and in­
trusion. A seriously ill or dying patient whose wishes are not 
honored may feel a captive of the machinery required for life­
sustaining measures or other medical interventions. Such forced 
treatment may burden that individual's liberty interests as much 
as any state coercion.12 
Justice Stevens went still further in his dissent in the same case: 
"Choices about death touch the core of liberty. Our duty, and the 
concomitant freedom, to come to terms with the conditions of our 
own mortality are undoubtedly 'so rooted in the traditions and con­
science of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'''13 
Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health 14 is the centerpiece 
in the development of a constitutional basis for the right to refuse 
medical treatment. The case magnified both the difficulty and the 
significance of the constitutional ruling because Nancy Cruzan, the 
patient involved, was in a persistent vegetative state and thus una­
9. Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914). 
10. For a brief history of the growth and legal variations of the right to refuse 
treatment, see Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270-80. 
11. Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93. 
12. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 288-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
13. Id. at 343 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 
97, 105 (1934». 
14. Id. 
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ble to contemporaneously communicate a decision about her medi­
cal treatment. A discussion of the Cruzan ruling and its context is 
central to appreciating the tenuous legal status of the right to refuse 
life-saving medical treatment. IS The depth and complexity of the 
Cruzan family's tragedy can only be hinted at here, but it is an im­
portant part of assessing the meaning of the constitutional doctrine 
in the case and the intensity of those who oppose the current con­
sensus about the right to refuse medical treatment.16 
Twenty-six year-old Nancy Cruzan was in a one-car automobile 
accident in early 1983, and her brain suffered twelve to fourteen 
minutes of oxygen deprivation before she could be resuscitated by 
paramedics. After nearly a month in a coma with virtually no sign 
of improvement, Nancy's father, Joe, and her husband, Paul Davis, 
signed a consent form to have a gastrostomy tube (for feeding and 
hydration) inserted surgically in Nancy's stomach in order to make 
her treatment and care easier.17 No Cruzan family member could 
have known that this was a decision that would result in seven years 
of litigation. As Joe Cruzan said later, "I had no idea I was signing 
away anybody's rights that day. I would have signed anything. We 
were just waiting for Nancy to wake Up."18 
Many months of medical interventions and family attention 
failed to yield any sustained improvement in her condition. Nancy 
eventually was given a diagnosis of "persistent vegetative state" 
(PVS).19 She was permanently unconscious-unaware, unrespon­
sive, unable to communicate, and deprived of any possibility of 
even the slightest recovery. Her very limited biological existence 
was sustained-or her dying was prolonged-by the artificial feed­
ing and hydration tube inserted in her abdomen, and by constant 
care from a loving family and a devoted staff at a state-supported 
medical facility in Missouri. She was not terminally ill, and in fact 
her metabolic existence could have been maintained for as many as 
15. As Justice Stevens put it, "Nancy Cruzan's liberty to be free from medical 
treatment must be understood in light of the facts and circumstances particular to her." 
Id. at 331. 
16. A comprehensive, engaging, and unbiased account of these events and of the 
accompanying litigation can be found in William H. Colby's excellent book, Long 
Goodbye: The Deaths of Nancy Cruzan. WILLIAM H. COLBY, LONG GOODBYE: THE 
DEATHS OF NANCY CRUZAN (2002). 
17. Id. at 17-22. 
18. Id. at 22. 
19. Doctors found that Nancy had been in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) 
since January 11, 1983. There was some debate about the actual date of the onset of the 
PVS, but just before the probate court hearing on removal of the feeding tube, no fewer 
than five doctors agreed that the PVS was long-standing and permanent. See id. at 100. 
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thirty years. Since she was in a state medical facility, the enormous 
expense of maintaining her in a PVS was born by the State of 
Missouri. 
Nancy Cruzan had had several informal conversations with 
friends that indicated that she would not want to be kept "alive" 
under circumstances such as those associated with being in a vege­
tative state, but she had no living will and had not appointed a 
healthcare proxy.20 By the fall of 1986, three and one-half years 
after the accident, and after the exhaustion of every medical option 
conceivable, Nancy Cruzan's parents (by then her legal guardians) 
reached the agonizing decision that her feeding and hydration tube 
should be removed and that she should be allowed to die peacefully 
in accordance with what the family understood to have been her 
expressed wishes. But the hospital, a state institution, would not 
agree unless so ordered by a court. In July 1988, a probate court 
found that there was sufficient evidence of Nancy's intent to war­
rant the removal of the feeding tube.21 
At that point, the media attention, which had already been in­
tense and intimidating to the family, became overwhelming. The 
question of how long Nancy Cruzan's death and the anguish of her 
family would be prolonged became a cultural and political cause 
celi'~bre as well as a significant constitutional contest. What had 
once been a most private, and in some senses, isolated family crisis, 
in which no person would wish to have to participate, had turned 
into a nationwide contest of seemingly boundless moral, political, 
cultural, religious, legal, and emotional significance in which indi­
20. Missouri law does not permit a living will to include the withdrawal of artifi­
cial feeding and hydration even from a person in a PVS. Mo. REV. STAT. § 459.010(3) 
(2006). This led Missouri Supreme Court Judge Welliver, in his dissent in Cruzan v. 
Harmon, to write, 
Yes, we Missourians can sign an instrument directing the withholding or 
withdrawal of death-prolonging procedures, but, after the Missouri amend­
ments, "death-prolonging procedure" does not include: (1) the "administra­
tion of medication," (2) "the performance of medical procedure [sic] deemed 
necessary to provide comfort, care or to alleviate pain" (3) "the performance 
of any procedure to provide nutrition," or (4) "the performance of any proce­
dure to provide ... hydration." If we cannot authorize withdrawing or with­
holding "medication," "nutrition" or "hydration," then what can we authorize 
to be withheld in Missouri? The Missouri Living Will Act is a fraud on Mis­
sourians who believe we have been given a right to execute a living will, and to 
die naturally, respectably, and in peace. 
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 442 (Mo. 1988) (Welliver, J., dissenting), affd, 
Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270-80 (1990). 
21. A history of the case, from the trial court up to the Missouri Supreme Court, 
can be found in Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408. 
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viduals, interest groups, politicians, religious figures, and pundits of 
every stripe seemed to feel entitled to characterize the Cruzan fam­
ily's motives and to control their actions.22 
The probate court's decision was appealed by the State of Mis­
souri, whose Attorney General was William Webster and whose 
Governor was John Ashcroft. It would not be an exaggeration to 
note that Nancy Cruzan's life was once again taken from her.23 The 
Missouri Supreme Court overturned the probate court, ruling, in 
effect, that clear and convincing evidence of Nancy Cruzan's inten­
tions, expressed at the time when she was legally competent, was 
not presented by the family's witnesses.24 The U.S. Supreme Court 
affirmed this decision in a five to four ruling in which Chief Justice 
Rehnquist wrote for the majority that "for purposes of this case, we 
assume that the United States Constitution would grant a compe­
tent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hy­
dration and nutrition."25 Still, the Court held that Missouri was 
constitutionally entitled to impose a rule of decision requiring clear 
and convincing evidence in such cases, thus sending the Cruzan 
family back to the local probate court to retry the issue of Nancy 
Cruzan's wishes. It had been seven and one-half years since an au­
tomobile accident had put Nancy Cruzan in a permanent vegetative 
state and the rest of the Cruzan family in a state of perpetual 
grieving. 
A new hearing was held using the required clear-and-convinc­
ing-evidence standard and, with very little new evidence, the court 
once again determined, on December 14, 1990, that it would have 
been Nancy Cruzan's wish not to be maintained in a progressively 
worsening PVS by continuing medical treatment that offered abso­
22. The Cruzan case bears similarities to the more recent case of Theresa Schiavo 
in the sense that an ideological and cultural public conflict seemed to supersede the 
private realities and values of the families; but the Cruzan case carries a heavier weight 
in constitutional doctrine on the right to refuse treatment. See, e.g., Barbara A. Noah, 
Politicizing the End of Life: Lessons from the Schiavo Controversy, 59 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 107 (2004). For medical and social work perspectives, as well as legal and policy 
commentary, see Special Issue, The Lessons o/the Terri Schiavo Case, 4 PALLIATIVE & 
SUPPORTIVE CARE 411 (2006). See also Gostin, Ethics, the Constitution and the Dying 
Process, supra note 1. 
23. When the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Stevens commented 
on the state's motives this way: "The opposition of life and liberty in this case are thus 
not the result of Nancy Cruzan's tragic accident, but are instead the artificial conse­
quence of Missouri's effort and this Court's willingness, to abstract Nancy Cruzan's life 
from Nancy Cruzan's person." Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 351 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
24. See Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 426. 
25. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279. 
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lutely no hope of any improvement in her condition. The State of 
Missouri did not appeal, and Nancy Cruzan's artificial feeding and 
hydration was withdrawn by court order that day.26 She finished 
dying on December 26, 1990, but not before some of the many 
protestors who had gathered outside the medical facility sought to 
break in on the Cruzans' bedside vigil and "rescue" Nancy with 
cups of water,27 Other protestors had circulated flyers describing 
Nancy as "smiling at amusing stories, weeping after visitors had left, 
'eating bananas, potatoes, and link sausages, and drinking juice' af­
ter her accident."28 Operation Rescue protestors, taking a page 
from their campaign against reproductive freedoms, had accused 
the Cruzans of being murderers.29 The conduct of the protestors 
prompted one judge to warn, in dismissing an Operation Rescue 
petition to extend the Cruzan family's agony, that "further filings 
could be [considered] an abuse of process. "30 
One other matter completes the context of the doctrinal de­
bate found in the Cruzan opinions. The Cruzan family's tragedy 
began with Nancy's accident and her rapid decline into unrecover­
able unconsciousness, but it was compounded by the fact that this 
loving family had to contend daily with a struggle magnified by the 
media, delayed by seemingly endless litigation, and seized upon by 
interest groups whose political goals or religious convictions must 
have seemed to those groups important enough to justify prolong­
ing not only Nancy's biological existence, but also the Cruzan fam­
ily's emotional and spiritual anguish. Under these conditions, 
Nancy's father Joe, though he ultimately prevailed in court, could 
hardly have considered the fruits of his long struggle on Nancy's 
behalf to be a win. More than five years after the world of politics 
26. COLBY, supra note 16, at 357-66. 
27. [d. at 373. 
28. [d. at 368; see id. at 367-80 (describing the protests at the hospital). The ab­
stract issue had become so intense that the protestors completely lost any sense of the 
reality of the case and any human understanding of the Cruzan family's ordeal. Colby 
reports that one judge became so exhausted by the protestors' attempts to exploit the 
judiciary that he interrupted one protestor's plea by saying, "'I just despise people like 
you' ... 'Get out of here.'" [d. at 380. 
29. Many of the protestors were from outside of Missouri and plainly veterans of 
campaigns against reproductive freedom. The intensity of these protestors and the sub­
stance of their arguments convey a sense in Colby's book that much more was at stake 
for them, and for the state's position in the litigation, than Nancy Cruzan's medical 
treatment or even the general principle of the right to refuse life-sustaining medical 
treatment. It was, perhaps, a single battle in a larger legal and cultural war. See gener­
ally id. at 368-80. 
30. [d. at 380. 
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and media had lost most of its interest in the meaning of this trag­
edy, Joe Cruzan-having achieved a victory that secured an irre­
trievable loss and having been exhausted by an emotional struggle 
with what must have seemed like a cold and unforgiving world of 
culture warriors-committed suicide.31 His suicide is perhaps the 
most poignant measure of the toll that polarizing politics can take 
on those individuals and families who are forced by circumstances 
to contend with the complex spiritual and physical realities-and 
the ambivalent emotions-that lie at the heart of a family tragedy 
like the Cruzans'. 
II. THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT: LEGAL 

DOCTRINE IN THE CRUZAN CASE 

A careful, contextual reading of the five opinions in the U.S. 
Supreme Court's five to four decision in Cruzan is both hopeful 
and discouraging for anyone interested in preserving the legal, med­
ical, and ethical consensus about the right to refuse unwanted medi­
cal treatment. In fact, so varied are the contextual and doctrinal 
bases of these opinions-and so pointed the disagreements among 
the Justices-that on the whole, Cruzan adds more ambiguity than 
clarity to the law in this area. The two main problems with the 
decision in Cruzan are discussed below. 
A. 	 A Tentative Statement of a Tenuous and Poorly Described 
Right 
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, 
concluding that there is nothing in the Constitution that forbids 
Missouri from adopting a clear and convincing evidentiary standard 
for those seeking to show that a patient in a PVS would want artifi­
cial feeding and hydration either withheld or withdrawn. In reach­
ing this conclusion, the Court explored the putative constitutional 
right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, but was willing to go 
no further than to state, 
The principle that a competent person has a constitutionally pro­
tected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment 
may be inferred from our prior decisions.... 
. . . . But for purposes of this case, we assume that the 
United States Constitution would grant a competent person a 
31. See id. at xii, 391-98. 
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constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and 
nutrition.32 
The other basis for a right to refuse medical treatment, tort 
law, and the requirement of informed consent, was explored at 
length by the Court, thereby demonstrating how much a part of 
American life and medicine that right has been for over seventy­
five years. But the crucial question put at issue by the probate 
court's holding in Cruzan and by the Missouri Supreme Court's re­
versal of that holding, was whether a constitutional basis for pro­
tecting this individual right, either as a matter of privacy or liberty, 
could be found. Chief Justice Rehnquist's exploration of the 
lengthy history of tort law on the subject, and his shorter history of 
state court rulings on the constitutional basis of the right, shows a 
wide variety of differing approaches and considerable disagreement 
and uncertainty about how to understand and approach the issue of 
the right to refuse medical treatment. In view of this, the Court's 
very tentative statement on the matter is not particularly helpful or 
encouragmg. 
The weakness of the Court's statement of the liberty right is 
put in bold relief by Justice Brennan's dissent, in which he com­
mented that the Court refused to discuss "either the measure of 
that liberty interest or its application," and concluded from his own 
extensive analysis that "if a competent person has a liberty interest 
to be free of unwanted medical treatment ... it must be fundamen­
tal. "33 Justice Brennan's discussion of the right to be free of un­
wanted medical treatment in tort and in related constitutional cases 
places the fundamental nature of the right in the context of all-too­
common human dilemmas: 
32. Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,278-79 (1990) (emphasis added). 
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion went a bit further: 
Requiring a competent adult to endure such procedures against her will bur­
dens the patient's liberty, dignity, and freedom to determine the course of her 
own treatment. Accordingly, the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process 
Clause must protect, if it protects anything, an individual's deeply personal 
decision to reject medical treatment. 
Id. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's was the swing vote in the 
case. 
33. Id. at 304 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The question of whether the liberty at 
stake here is fundamental is central; and in this case that question is made more com­
plex by the fact that Nancy Cruzan was not legally competent to exercise the right­
fundamental or not-herself. See id. at 321-26 (discussing the loss of decisional capac­
ity and the clear and convincing standard of evidence). 
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The right to be free from medical attention without consent, 
to determine what shall be done with one's own body, is deeply 
rooted in this Nation's traditions .... 
The right to be free from unwanted medical attention is a 
right to evaluate the potential benefit of treatment and its possi­
ble consequences according to one's own values and to make a 
personal decision whether to subject oneself to the intrusion .... 
. . . . Dying is personal. And it is profound. For many, the 
thought of an ignoble end, steeped in decay, is abhorrent. ... "In 
certain, thankfully rare, circumstances the burden of maintaining 
the corporeal existence degrades the very humanity it was meant 
to serve."34 
Had the Court taken the measure of the liberty interest at 
stake and found it to have been a fundamental one, not only would 
the state's burden in justifying its attempt to infringe upon Nancy 
Cruzan's liberty have been considerably greater, but the value of 
Cruzan as precedent would also have been greater. 
Justice Brennan's understanding of the right to refuse life-sus­
taining treatment in general-and of what was at stake for the 
Cruzans and for the thousands of other families with loved ones in a 
PVS-highlights the paleness of Chief Justice Rehnquist's under­
standing of these same matters. For example, the majority opinion 
claimed that "[a]n erroneous decision not to terminate [Nancy 
Cruzan's medical treatment] results in a maintenance of the status 
quo [and suggests that medical or evidentiary discoveries] create 
the potential that a wrong decision [not to terminate] will eventu­
ally be corrected or its impact mitigated."35 Justice Brennan saw a 
dimension that reflects the actual experience of families faced with 
complex and heart-wrenching decisions about artificial life support. 
But, from the point of view of the patient, an erroneous de­
cision in either direction is irrevocable. . . . An erroneous deci­
sion not to terminate life support ... robs a patient of the very 
qualities protected by the right to avoid unwanted medical treat­
ment. His own degraded existence is perpetuated; his family's 
34. Id. at 305-11 (quoting Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626, 
635-36 (Mass. 1986». The fact that end-of-life treatment issues have become more dif­
ficult and more common with the extraordinary rise of medical technology in the past 
half century does not lessen the historical importance of these aspects of individual 
liberty. 
35. Id. at 283 (majority opinion). 
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suffering is protracted; the memory he leaves behind becomes 
more and more distorted.36 
Justice Stevens put the difference between the majority's and 
dissent's understandings of the rights and realities of the case in still 
bolder relief. In describing the nature of the individual liberty at 
stake, Justice Stevens reasoned that just as the physical aspects of 
life are protected by individual liberty, "so too the constitutional 
protection for the human body is surely inseparable from concern 
for the mind and spirit that dwell therein. "37 He noted as well that 
the right to refuse treatment "presupposes no abandonment of the 
desire for life. Nor is it reducible to a protection against batteries 
undertaken in the name of treatment, or to a guarantee against the 
infliction of bodily discomfort. "38 After noting that the Court was 
willing to ignore Nancy Cruzan's best interests and to minimize im­
portant aspects of her liberty interest, Justice Stevens observed that 
"[t]he Court's willingness to find a waiver of this constitutional right 
reveals a distressing misunderstanding of the importance of individ­
ual liberty. "39 
The strength of the Court's statement about the liberty interest 
at stake in refusing unwanted medical treatment was thrown into 
further doubt by Justice Scalia's concurring opinion. Justice Scalia's 
opinion considered any refusal of life-sustaining (or death-prolong­
ing) medical treatment to be an act of attempted suicide; and he 
claimed that "American law has always accorded the State the 
power to prevent, by force if necessary, suicide-including suicide 
by refusing to take appropriate measures necessary to preserve 
one's own life."40 Justice Scalia supported the requirement of clear 
36. Id. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens went still further in exam­
ining the meaning of Cruzan's liberty interest. 
Insofar as Nancy Cruzan has an interest in being remembered for how she 
lived rather than how she died, the damage done to those memories by the 
prolongation of her death is irreversible. Insofar as Nancy Cruzan has an in­
terest in the cessation of any pain, the continuation of her pain is irreversible. 
Insofar as Nancy Cruzan has an interest in a closure to her life consistent with 
her own beliefs rather than those of the Missouri legislature, the State's impo­
sition of its contrary view is irreversible. To deny the importance of these 
consequences is in effect to deny that Nancy Cruzan has interests at all, and 
thereby to deny her personhood in the name of preserving the sanctity of her 
life. 
Id. at 353 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
37. Id. at 343 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
38. Id. 
39. !d. at 339. 
40. Id. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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and convincing evidence in Cruzan, but would have preferred to 
have left the whole controversy to decision by a majority of Mis­
souri voters: "[E]ven when it is demonstrated by clear and convinc­
ing evidence that a patient no longer wishes certain measures to be 
taken to preserve his or her life, it is up to the citizens of Missouri 
to decide, through their elected representatives, whether that wish 
will be honored. "41 
In view of this opinion, Justice Scalia's concurrence with the 
Court's assumption of the existence of a liberty interest in Cruzan 
seems disingenuous at best, and the legal value of the Court's as­
sumption must be discounted considerably because of it. In his dis­
sent, Justice Stevens suggested that because of the spiritual 
dimension to decisions such as those made by the Cruzan family, 
religious freedoms are implicated: "[N]ot much may be said with 
confidence about death unless it is said from faith, and that alone is 
reason enough to protect the freedom to conform choices about 
death to individual conscience. . .. Our ethical tradition has long 
regarded an appreciation of mortality as essential to understanding 
life's significance."42 But Justice Scalia would have none of it: "This 
is a view that some societies have held, and that our States are free 
to adopt if they wish. But it is not a view imposed by our constitu­
tional traditions, in which the power of the State to prohibit suicide 
is unquestionable. "43 
Some of these weaknesses in the Court's statement about the 
right to refuse medical treatment also arise because of differences 
in the ways in which the question before the Court is described. 
The Chief Justice stated that Cruzan was "the first case ... squarely 
present[ing the question of] whether the Constitution grants what is 
in common parlance referred to as a 'right to die.' "44 This may 
41. Id. (emphasis added). Although Justice Scalia couches this argument in terms 
of restraining activist judges, it is in fact an argument that there is no constitutional (as 
opposed to common law) right of individuals to be free of unwanted, life-sustaining 
medical treatment. This suggests that the state's power over what many Americans and 
much of jurisprudence consider fundamental to constitutional democracy is nearly un­
limited. For a similar view about the power of political majorities to control family and 
individual life, see Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872 (1990). 
42. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 343 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
43. Id. at 300 (Scalia, J., concurring). This statement is especially problematic for 
the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment-or perhaps any treatment-because Jus­
tice Scalia considers such decisions to be attempted suicide. For a discussion of why the 
suicide formulation is "too simplistic," see Cantor, supra note 1, at 409. 
44. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277. This formulation may have been useful rhetorically 
to the Chief Justice in Cruzan, but it would become problematic for him in the physi­
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have been useful in arousing opposition to the claimed right. The 
majority opinion had also described the question as "whether 
Cruzan has a right under the United States Constitution which 
would require the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment 
from her. "45 This may have been useful in casting the focus of the 
issue away from Nancy Cruzan's decision and onto the idea that the 
state would be causing her death by allowing her treatment to be 
stopped. The Court also put the question in terms of Missouri's 
rule of decision,46 making it seem like a merely procedural question 
rather than one of substantive rights. Justice Brennan's dissent also 
makes use of a Justice's prerogative to state the question in a way 
that partially answers itself to his or her own liking. "The question 
before this Court is a relatively narrow one: whether the Due Pro­
cess Clause allows Missouri to require a now-incompetent patient 
in an irreversible PVS to remain on life support absent rigorously 
clear and convincing evidence that avoiding the treatment repre­
sents the patient's prior, express choice."47 
But the most telling formulation of the question in Cruzan, the 
one that acknowledges and is based upon the actual context of the 
case and of the Cruzan family's dilemma, is provided by Justice 
Stevens: 
If Nancy Cruzan has no interest in continued treatment, and if 
she has a liberty interest in being free from unwanted treatment, 
and if the cessation of treatment would have no adverse impact 
on third parties, and if no reason exists to doubt the good faith of 
Nancy's parents, then what possible basis could the State have 
for insisting upon continued medical treatment?48 
cian-assisted suicide case, Washington v. Glucksberg, where he claimed that the Cruzan 
Court had been more specific and careful in its use of words. See Washington v. Gluck­
sberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997). 
45. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269. 
46. /d. at 277. 
47. /d. at 303 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
48. Id. at 334 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The question of why Missouri Attorney 
General William L. Webster and Governor John Ashcroft intervened in the first 
place-of what the state's interests really were-is made more pointed when one re­
flects on the second probate court's finding after the Supreme Court's ruling. Using 
virtually the same evidence and the required clear and convincing standard, the judge 
ruled again that Nancy Cruzan would have wanted treatment terminated and ordered it 
done. COLBY, supra note 16, at 359-62. After that second ruling, there was no appeal 
ordered by Webster or Ashcroft. Id. at 365-66. The state's interest had apparently been 
satisfied by the Court's right-to-life logic, not by the actual outcome of the case. 
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B. 	 Misstating the State's Interests and Accepting its Imbalanced 
Procedure 
With even a grudging declaration that there is an individual 
liberty interest in refusing medical treatment, the balancing of a 
state's legitimate interest in overcoming that right was central to the 
ruling in Cruzan. The Court began its analysis with a distillation of 
state interests in right-to-refuse-treatment cases at the state level, 
including "the preservation of life, the protection of the interests of 
innocent third parties, the prevention of suicide, and the mainte­
nance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession."49 The 
Court concluded that "Missouri relie[d] on its interest in the protec­
tion and preservation of human life, [to justify imposing a clear and 
convincing evidence standard] and [ that] there can be no gainsaying 
this interest. "50 The Court then made two arguments central to its 
conclusion that the state's interest in the protection and preserva­
tion of life was more than strong enough to justify the burden that 
Missouri placed upon the exercise of Nancy Cruzan's liberty 
interest. 
First, the Court stated that the real question was one of accu­
racy of decision-of whether there was sufficient evidence to en­
sure that Nancy Cruzan's wishes actually were that her medical 
treatment should be terminated if she were in a PVS.51 Here, the 
Court claimed that the clear and convincing evidence standard that 
it approved is merely a procedural safeguard designed to provide 
assurance of the accuracy of any finding about Cruzan's wishes. 
Second, the Court reasoned that "a State may properly decline to 
make judgments about the 'quality' of life that any particular indi­
vidual may enjoy"52 by acting to preserve metabolic existence no 
matter what the circumstances. There are weaknesses in the rea­
soning of each of these arguments for Cruzan's elevating the consti­
tutional status of the state's interest in protecting and preserving 
life. As a result, the case becomes an exemplar of how easily the 
49. 	 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271. 
50. 	 Id. at 280. 
51. See id. at 281. This question is raised by the fact that Ms. Cruzan was medi­
cally and legally incompetent to assert her own rights or to express her own wishes 
because she had been in a PVS for years after her auto accident. Id. at 266. Since she 
did not have an advance directive (i.e., a living will or healthcare proxy), it became 
necessary for her family to try to piece together what she did say and what she would 
have wished about her medical treatment. The State joined the struggle over her fate 
when her parents and co-guardians informed the state hospital director of their decision 
and he refused to comply without a court order. COLBY, supra note 16, at 49-50. 
52. 	 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281. 
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tenuous constitutional right to refuse medical treatment can be 
trumped by an artificially enhanced state interest in protecting life. 
As to the first argument, the majority opinion in Cruzan stated 
that Missouri recognized the right of a surrogate to terminate artifi­
cial feeding and nutrition under certain circumstances, but "it has 
established a procedural safeguard to assure that the action of the 
surrogate conforms as best it may to the wishes expressed by the 
patient while competent."53 But Justice Brennan's dissent pointed 
out that this is not a substantively neutral procedural protection, 
but a "markedly asymmetrical evidentiary burden" upon Nancy 
Cruzan's fundamental right to refuse medical treatment.54 The 
clear and convincing evidence standard was applied to the question 
of whether Cruzan would want the life support removed, but not to 
the question of whether she would want the life support contin­
ued.55 Because of this imbalance, an ostensibly neutral procedural 
requirement had the foreseeable effect of creating a presumption 
that the state's definition of life would prevail. 
The Court sought to bolster its argument about the rule of de­
cision by claiming that an erroneous decision to terminate life sup­
port is irrevocable, while an erroneous decision not to terminate life 
support does no real harm to the patient or her liberty interest.56 
The weakness in this argument is a reflection of the Chief Justice's 
apparent unwillingness to discuss the nature and scope of Cruzan's 
liberty interest, as Justice Brennan pointed out.57 The Court also 
argued that a rule of decision, whether requiring clear and convinc­
ing evidence or proof beyond a reasonable doubt, was created to 
"'instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our 
society thinks he should have in ... a particular type of adjudica­
tion,' "58 and to distribute the risk of error in the decision accord­
ingly. Again, Justice Brennan exposed the flaw in the argument: 
In the cases cited by the majority, the imbalance imposed by 
a heightened evidentiary standard was not only acceptable but 
53. [d. at 280. 
54. [d. at 316 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
55. [d. 
56. /d. at 283 (majority opinion). 
57. See supra notes 33-34, 36 and accompanying text. 
58. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 
(1979)). Though the mere mention of proof beyond a reasonable doubt may seem ex­
treme in the context of the Cruzan case, it has been advocated as appropriate for termi­
nating life support. See Steven G. Calabresi, The Terri Schiavo Case: In Defense of the 
Special Law Enacted by Congress and President Bush, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 151, 164-66 
(2006). 
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required because the standard was deployed to protect an indi­
vidual's exercise of a fundamental right, as the majority admits. 
In contrast, the Missouri court imposed a clear and convincing 
evidence standard as an obstacle to the exercise of a fundamental 
right.59 
Brennan also pointed out that there are other, more even­
handed and effective protections available to minimize the risks of 
an inaccurate decision about a patient's wishes. The easiest exam­
ple is the guardian ad litem, whose "task is to uncover any conflicts 
of interest and ensure that each party likely to have relevant evi­
dence is consulted and brought forward. "60 The trial court em­
ployed such a guardian, but his recommendations and findings were 
ignored by the Missouri Supreme Court.61 
The U.S. Supreme Court's use of the procedural argument is 
thus misleading not only in its substance, but also in its conse­
quences; for it masks the fact that the Cruzan opinion simultane­
ously inflates the state's interest and "evinces a disdain for Nancy 
Cruzan's own right to choose,"62 without admitting that it is doing 
either. Consequently, the strength of the Cruzan decision as a pro­
tection for the individual right to refuse medical treatment is ren­
dered even lower than might appear from reading the language of 
the Court's holding. It is troublesome also that the Court's ap­
proval of the imbalanced standard of proof increases the polariza­
tion that is always present in an adversarial process. This 
adversarial intensity is traditionally regarded as useful to achieving 
truth in high-stakes cases, but it is far from clear that it will have 
any such effect on the very complex, emotional, and often ambiva­
lent decisions about terminating medical treatment or seeking palli­
ative care. In fact, it could be argued that it is just this process that 
encourages interest groups and others far removed from family 
tragedies like the Cruzans' to seek to turn difficult and intensely 
private family decisions into polarizing public battles in the culture 
wars. The result is the politicization of the doctor/patient 
relationship. 
59. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 319-20 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). It 
should also be noted that the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, for 
example, is imposed in criminal cases in part to help rectify the extraordinary imbalance 
of power between the state as prosecutor and an individual defendant. In the Cruzan 
opinion, it appears that the object was to increase, rather than rectify, an imbalance of 
power. 
60. Id. at 318. 
61. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 422-24 (Mo. 1988). 
62. Cruzan, 497 U,S, at 325 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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The Court's second argument for the primacy of Missouri's in­
terest in preserving life is no more compelling than its argument 
about the rule of decision. Its statement about Missouri's refusal to 
make a judgment about "quality of life" is appealing in that it reso­
nates with disabled persons who are rightfully concerned that 
American society and law devalue their personhood and would de­
prive them of important rights if not restrained by an appropriate 
legal analysis of state interests and by a better-educated public. 
The Court's statement is also aimed at those who believe that state 
power at all levels is excessive and is becoming a general danger to 
individual liberty. But in fact the State of Missouri did adopt a par­
ticular judgment about the quality of life. It decided that no matter 
how painful, how divorced from awareness or responsiveness, or 
how much at odds with the wishes of the person whose life it is,63 
metabolic life that would cease naturally must be preserved by 
medical technology-and "by force if necessary."64 
Beyond the problem of the Court's somewhat disingenuous 
logic-its attempt to christen Missouri's interest in preserving any 
quality of life by artificial means as not a judgment about quality of 
life-there is the problem of the decision's consequences. Award­
ing to the state, instead of to the individual, the power to determine 
what life must be preserved carries with it the constitutional possi­
bility that a state could adopt another, more nefarious determina­
tion setting out which lives must be preserved and which sacrificed. 
Justice Stevens put it this way: 
Today the State of Missouri has announced its intent to 
spend several hundred thousand dollars in preserving the life of 
Nancy Beth Cruzan in order to vindicate its general policy favor­
ing the preservation of human life. Tomorrow, another State 
equally eager to champion an interest in the "quality of life" 
might favor a policy designed to ensure quick and comfortable 
deaths by denying treatment to categories of marginally hopeless 
cases.65 
63. That Missouri was determined to overcome even the most clear and convinc­
ing statement by even a competent person wishing to refuse medical treatment under 
certain circumstances can be seen from its living will statute, which cannot be used to 
refuse or terminate artificial feeding and hydration for a person in a PVS. Even had 
Nancy Cruzan filled out a living will making her wishes crystal clear, the State's defini­
tion of quality of life would still have trumped her individual wishes. See supra note 20. 
64. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
65. Id. at 354-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The phenomenon to which Justice Ste­
vens refers-patients or their families insisting upon the use of scarce medical resources 
to provide what the medical profession would consider "futile" treatments for a particu­
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There is also the problem of the sectarian nature of the particu­
lar definition of life that is implied by Missouri's decision about the 
quality of life that must be preserved by any and all means. Mis­
souri has in effect adopted a particular Christian view and defini­
tion of life, its meaning, and nature. To many Americans, there is 
nothing wrong with this particular theological view of life, but 
under the Constitution, the state is forbidden from denying to indi­
viduals-indeed, does not have the power to deny to individuals­
the right to determine these fundamental spiritual questions for 
themselves. As Justice Stevens put it, 
In short, there is no reasonable ground for believing that 
Nancy Beth Cruzan has any personal interest in the perpetuation 
of what the State has decided is her life. . .. [I]t would be possi­
ble to hypothesize such an interest on the basis of theological or 
philosophical conjecture. But even to posit such a basis for the 
State's action is to condemn it. It is not within the province of 
secular government to circumscribe the liberties of the people by 
regulations designed wholly for the purpose of establishing a sec­
tarian definition of life.66 
It may be argued reasonably that the majority OpInIOn in 
Cruzan serves purposes opposite to many of those it claims to ad­
vance. Justice Stevens asked the fundamental question about "what 
possible basis" the State of Missouri could have in resisting the 
lar patient-is becoming a legal issue as common as refusing medical treatment. For a 
discussion of this issue, how some states are handling it, and its relationship to the 
autonomy principle, see Zita Lazzarini et aI., Legal and Policy Lessons from the Schiavo 
Case: Is Our Right to Choose the Medical Care We Want Seriously at Risk?, 4 PALLIA­
TIVE & SUPPORTIVE CARE 1, 6-8 (2006). 
66. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 350 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Webster v. Reprod. 
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 566-72 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting». Justice Stevens 
here referred to his dissent in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, a case in which 
the Court had accepted a Missouri legislative definition of life in the preamble to a 
statute restricting abortion rights. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 506­
07 (1989). The strategic connection between the right to refuse medical treatment and 
the right to reproductive freedom is found again two years after Cruzan, in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). In writing the 
opinion for the Court, Justice O'Connor reviewed the standards by which the weight of 
a precedent like Roe v. Wade should be judged. Id. at 857 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113, 152-53 (1973». Justice O'Connor's opinion that Roe should not be overruled in­
cluded the following: "Roe, however, may be seen not only as an exemplar of Griswold 
liberty but as a rule (whether or not mistaken) of personal autonomy and bodily integ­
rity, with doctrinal affinity to cases recognizing limits on governmental power to man­
date medical treatment or to bar its rejection." Id. Had Cruzan rejected outright the 
constitutional basis of the right to refuse medical treatment, the case could have further 
weakened the right to choose to have an abortion, as reaffirmed in Casey. Id. 
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Cruzan family and in denying Nancy Cruzan's constitutional right 
to refuse treatment.67 He answered his own question: "The State's 
unflagging determination to perpetuate Nancy Cruzan's physical 
existence is comprehensible only as an effort to define life's mean­
ing, not as an attempt to preserve its sanctity."68 Once the Supreme 
Court had accepted, or at least allowed to stand, the Missouri defi­
nition of life, there would be no more reason for state officials to 
bedevil the Cruzan family; and they did not do SO.69 
III. FROM CRUZAN TO GLUCKSBERG: THE RIGHT TO REFUSE 

TREATMENT AND THE NEED FOR PALLIATIVE CARE AT 

THE END OF LIFE 

On December 14, 1990, Nancy Cruzan's artificial feeding and 
hydration tube was removed by order of a Missouri probate court, 
almost eight years after the automobile accident that had left her in 
a PVS. In the twelve days that it took her to finish dying in the 
hospice wing of the hospital, she received no medication or medical 
intervention. Because of the nature of her condition, she needed 
no palliative care. But every year, thousands, perhaps hundreds of 
thousands, of severely ill people do need palliative care as their 
lives end. Those in need of palliative care are most often patients 
who have decided to refuse medical treatment or to withdraw life­
sustaining medical intervention.7° Medical treatment may have lost 
its effectiveness, the suffering caused by the treatment or the dis­
ease may have become greater than any benefit that treatment pro­
vides, or a terminally ill patient may have decided for any number 
of personal, spiritual, familial, or other reasons that the best course 
67. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 334 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
68. Id. at 345. Justice Stevens also argued that "[h]owever commendable may be 
the State's interest in human life, it cannot pursue that interest by appropriating Nancy 
Cruzan's life as a symbol for its own purposes." Id. at 356. But it appears to have done 
just that. 
69. Not only does the reasoning of the Cruzan majority render uncertain its use­
fulness in the growing struggle over the individual right to refuse medical treatment, but 
the highly conflicted opinions in the case also reflect and may encourage the kind of 
polarizing behavior that made the Cruzans' struggle so long and painful. 
70. In Justice Brennan's dissent in Cruzan, he noted that "[o]f the approximately 
2 million people who die each year, 80% die in hospitals and long-term care institutions, 
and perhaps 70% of those after a decision to forgo life-sustaining treatment has been 
made." Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 302-03 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing H.L. Lipton, Do­
Not-Resuscitate Decisions in a Community Hospital: Incidence, Implications and Out­
comes, 256 JAMA 1164, 1168 (1986)). More recent studies confirm these proportions. 
See, e.g., LAST ACTS, MEANS TO A BETTER END: A REPORT ON DYING IN AMERICA 
TODAY (2002), available at http://www.rwjf.org/files/publications/other/meansbetterend. 
pdf. 
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for whatever time they have remaining may lie not with medical 
treatment, but with palliative care. In any of these circumstances­
whether a patient is taken off life-sustaining interventions such as 
respirators or artificial feeding and nutrition, refuses chemotherapy 
or antibiotics to treat their condition, or simply decides to let a 
medical condition take its course-the dying process may involve 
severe or intractable pain, agitation, or other forms of physical dis­
tress, loss of control of bodily functions, or any number of other 
symptoms that can be successfully ameliorated by a physician's ac­
tive provision of adequate palliative care.71 
These facts of dying, especially the problem of severe pain at 
the end of life, were recognized as being of possible constitutional 
significance by several Justices in the 1997 companion cases of 
Washington v. Glucksberg72 and Vacca v. Quill.73 These cases 
unanimously upheld the power of a state to criminalize physician­
assisted suicide, and each refused to find a fundamental individual 
right to hasten one's own death. But in the process of writing six 
opinions articulating the reasoning of the decisions, the Justices sug­
gest that there might be situations in which a state's interference 
with a terminally ill patient's ability to get adequate pain relief 
would violate-or lead the Court to discover-an as-yet unarticu­
lated constitutional right. To get to these comments about a central 
aspect of palliative care for the terminally ill, the Justices had to 
consider the meaning of Cruzan and the constitutional status of the 
right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment.74 
71. See LIVING WITH DYING, supra note 2. A moving and informative discussion 
of the medical and humane aspects of the end of life can be found in How We Die, by 
Sherwin B. Nuland. SHERWIN B. NULAND, How WE DIE (Vintage Books 1995). 
72. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (holding that Washington 
State's law against assisting or encouraging suicide does not violate Fourteenth Amend­
ment individual liberty interests, even as applied to competent, terminally ill patients 
who request physician assistance in hastening their imminent deaths). 
73. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (holding that New York's statute making 
physician-assisted suicide a crime does not irrationally deprive of physician assistance in 
hastening death only those terminally ill patients who are not on life support). In Quill, 
the Court found no equal protection violation in a state law permitting those terminally 
ill who have refused medical treatment or have had life support withdrawn to receive 
active palliative care from a physician, but denying those terminally ill who are neither 
on life support nor in need of life-sustaining treatment the chance to receive the active 
assistance of a physician in hastening even an imminent death. Id. at 808-09. 
74. The Ninth Circuit majority had used Cruzan, along with the reproductive 
freedom case, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, to justify its decision that Washington 
State's criminalization of physician assisted suicide violated the fundamental liberty 
rights of legally competent, terminally ill patients. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 
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A constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining medical treat­
ment seems to be supported by the Glucksberg and Quill decisions, 
at least insofar as most of the opinions in the cases suggest in one 
way or another that refusing treatment is not suicide and is there­
fore distinguishable from the physician-assisted suicide that the 
Court rejects. But the Glucksberg and Quill opinions continue the 
ambiguous status of Cruzan and seem to confirm its continuing 
weakness as a protection for the right to refuse medical treatment. 
In Glucksberg, for example, the Chief Justice reiterated his mini­
malist statement from Cruzan that "[w]e have also assumed, and 
strongly suggested, that the Due Process Clause protects the tradi­
tional right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment."75 He 
relegated a slightly stronger statement to a footnote discussion of 
the Court's view about the creation of substantive due process 
rights: "[W]e concluded that the right to refuse unwanted medical 
treatment was so rooted in our history, tradition, and practice as to 
require special protection under the Fourteenth Amendment."76 In 
Quill, the value of Cruzan as a constitutional precedent was re­
duced still further by describing it as primarily grounded in tort law: 
"[O]ur assumption of a right to refuse treatment was grounded not, 
as the Court of Appeals supposed, on the proposition that patients 
have a general and abstract 'right to hasten death,' but on well­
established, traditional rights to bodily integrity and freedom from 
unwanted touching."77 
In spite of minimizing a constitutional grounding for the right 
to refuse treatment, there is significant discussion of the real needs 
of terminally ill patients to have access to pain relief and perhaps to 
other forms of palliative care. The suggestion that five Justices in 
1997 were as sympathetic to a putative right to palliative care as 
they were opposed to finding a right to a physician's assistance in 
hastening even an imminent death was raised by Professor Robert 
Burt in the New England Journal of Medicine four months after the 
Glucksberg and Quill decisions were handed down.78 Professor 
79 F.3d 790, 813-16 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309 
(1994). 
75. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720. 
76. Id. at 721 n.17. 
77. Quill, 521 U.S. at 807 (citation omitted) (quoting Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 
727 (2d Cir. 1996». 
78. Robert A. Burt, The Supreme Court Speaks: Not Assisted Suicide but a Con­
stitutional Right to Palliative Care, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1234 (1997) [hereinafter Burt, 
The Supreme Court Speaks). Burt's observations about the importance of adequate 
pain management formed the basis of a further development of the issue in a 1999 
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Burt's analysis of Glucksberg and Quill concluded that "[a] Court 
majority effectively required all states to ensure that their laws do 
not obstruct the provision of adequate palliative care, especially for 
the alleviation of pain and other physical symptoms of people fac­
ing death."79 Burt's analysis of the opinions of Justices O'Connor, 
Ginsburg, Breyer, Stevens, and Souter demonstrates that these Jus­
tices shared a sympathy for the plight of the many severely ill peo­
ple not on life support who might have sought a physician's 
assistance in making their deaths more dignified had New York and 
Washington State not criminalized physician-assisted suicide. None 
of the Justices were prepared to find in the Constitution a right to 
physician-assisted suicide, but they were plainly concerned about 
whether any state's law unjustifiably aggravated the conditions of 
dying in America. Accordingly, the Justices provided a number of 
significant indications that state action that hinders the provision of 
adequate pain relief might constitute a fact pattern that would 
prompt the Court to announce a right to palliative care. Justice 
Breyer put it this way: 
[A]s Justice O'Connor points out, the laws before us do not force 
a dying person to undergo that kind of pain.... Rather, the laws 
of New York and of Washington do not prohibit doctors from 
providing patients with drugs sufficient to control pain despite 
the risk that those drugs themselves will kill. . . . Were the legal 
circumstances different-for example, were state law to prevent 
the provision of palliative care, including the administration of 
article by Charles Wilson. Charles Wilson, Establishing a Right to Palliative Care at the 
End of Life: The Litigation Alternative, 2 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 15 (1999). Wilson's arti­
cle focuses on problems of pain management attributable to state medical boards, inad­
equate medical education and "the attitudes of those involved in the dying process." 
Id. at 18; see also Lawrence O. Gostin, Deciding Life and Death in the Courtroom: 
From Quinlan to Cruzan, Glucksberg, and Vacco-A Brief History and Analysis of 
Constitutional Protection of the 'Right to Die', 278 JAMA 1523, 1523-28 (1997). 
79. Burt, The Supreme Court Speaks, supra note 78, at 1234. The brief of the 
United States Justice Department in Glucksberg, which supported the constitutionality 
of New York's and Washington State's statutes criminalizing physician-assisted suicide, 
nevertheless argued that depriving a person of humane treatment implicates a signifi­
cant liberty interest. The Justice Department argued that 
[t]he term "liberty" in the Due Process Clause, however, is broad enough to 
encompass an interest on the part of terminally ill, mentally competent adults 
in obtaining relief from the kind of suffering experienced by the plaintiffs in 
this case, which includes not only severe physical pain, but also the despair and 
distress that comes from physical deterioration and the inability to control ba­
sic bodily and mental functions. 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 12, Washington 
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1996) (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 663185. 
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drugs as needed to avoid pain at the end of life-then the law's 
impact upon serious and otherwise unavoidable physical pain 
(accompanying death) would be more directly at issue. And as 
Justice O'Connor suggests, the Court might have to revisit its 
conclusions in these cases.80 
It is significant that in describing the problem of adequate pain 
management, Justices Breyer and O'Connor suggested that a state 
might not constitutionally be able to prevent doctors from provid­
ing even that pain control that might carry with it "the risk that 
those drugs themselves will ki11."81 It is frequently the case that for 
those dying persons in severe or intractable pain, a medication 
given to reduce the pain to tolerable levels could have the secon­
dary effect of hastening death. The real differences between that 
form of palliative care and the provision of active physician assis­
tance in hastening dying (such as that prohibited by the laws of New 
York and Washington State) can be difficult to articulate and troub­
ling to some lawmakers and physicians.82 
Justice Breyer's opinion on pain relief and on the rule of 
double effect is all the more interesting in view of the facts and 
theory of the Quill case.83 Quill was an equal-protection case in 
which the plaintiffs claimed that the State of New York had no con­
stitutionally justifiable reason to treat two groups of virtually identi­
cal, terminally ill patients in such different ways. In particular, the 
plaintiffs claimed that New York law concerning the terminally ill 
80. Burt, The Supreme Court Speaks, supra note 78, at 1235 (citing Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 791-92 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring), decided with Vacco v. 
Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring)). 
81. [d. The issue of adequate pain management is both legal and medical. See, 
e.g., Amy J. Di1cher, Damned if They Do, Damned if They Don't: The Need for a Com­
prehensive Public Policy to Address the Inadequate Management of Pain, 13 ANNALS 
HEALTH L. 81 (2004); Beth Packman Weinman, Freedom from Pain: Establishing a 
Constitutional Right to Pain Relief, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 495 (2003); Ben A. Rich, A Pre­
scription for the Pain: The Emerging Standard of Care for Pain Management, 26 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REv. 1 (2000); Norman L. Cantor & George C. Thomas III, Pain Relief, 
Acceleration of Death, and Criminal Law, 6 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 107, 107-27 
(1996). 
82. The medical phenomenon is called the "rule of double effect." For a discus­
sion of the problem as it relates to the practice of palliative care medicine, see Lewis 
Cohen et aI., Accusations of Murder and Euthanasia in End-of-Life Care, 8 J. PALLIA. 
TIVE MED. 1096, 1096-1104 (2005). Another form of relief for severe pain and agita­
tion, terminal sedation, also blurs the line between palliative care and physician-assisted 
suicide, and it also troubles some physicians and policy makers. See, e.g., David Oren­
tlicher, The Supreme Court and Terminal Sedation: Rejecting Assisted Suicide, Embrac­
ing Euthanasia, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 947 (1997). 
83. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
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was arbitrary and irrational. New York permitted competent, ter­
minally ill patients on life support to have the assistance of a physi­
cian in hastening death by withdrawing that life support and by 
providing the pain relief and other palliative care that is often a 
necessary part of easing the pain associated with the death that re­
sults from such withdrawal. At the same time, according to the 
plaintiffs, New York's ban on physician-assisted suicide prohibited 
those patients who were equally terminally ill, equally in pain, and 
equally competent-but who do not happen to require or receive 
life support-from receiving a physician's assistance in hastening 
death through the prescription of self-administered lethal medica­
tion. In a unanimous decision, the Court reversed the Second Cir­
cuit and found that New York's classification of these two groups of 
terminally ill persons was constitutionally justified. 
The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that some termi­
nally ill people-those who are on life support-systems-are 
treated differently than those who are not, in that the former may 
"hasten death" by ending treatment, but the latter may not 
"hasten death" through physician assisted suicide. This conclu­
sion depends on the submission that ending or refusing lifesaving 
medical treatment "is nothing more nor less than assisted sui­
cide." Unlike the Court of Appeals, we think the distinction be­
tween assisting suicide and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, 
a distinction widely recognized and endorsed in the medical pro­
fession and in our legal traditions, is both important and logical; 
it is certainly rational. The distinction comports with fundamen­
tal legal principles of causation and intent.84 
The Court provides a lengthy analysis of the two distinctions­
causation and intent-that it says underlie the reasonableness of 
how New York law treats the terminally ill. These arguments do 
seem reasonable when one defines the problem as one of distin­
guishing between refusing life-sustaining treatment on the one hand 
and requesting a physician'S assistance in committing suicide on the 
other.85 The Quill Court was thus able to ground these distinctions 
84. Id. at 800 (citations omitted). 
85. In defending the distinction, Chief Justice Rehnquist points out that, "New 
York has acted several times to protect patients' common law right to refuse treat­
ment." Id. at 806. But several states are now considering legislation that would declare 
that, contrary to the holding in Cruzan. the provision of artificial feeding and hydration 
is not medical treatment and therefore cannot be the subject of a right to refuse treat­
ment. See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. The weakness of this reassurance 
about the protections at stake here points up the importance of finding a fundamental 
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in the state's legitimate interests as discussed in Glucksberg and 
Cruzan: 
By permitting everyone to refuse unwanted medical treatment 
while prohibiting anyone from assisting a suicide, New York law 
follows a longstanding and rational distinction. New York's rea­
sons for recognizing and acting on this distinction-including 
prohibiting intentional killing and preserving life; preventing sui­
cide; maintaining physicians' role as their patients' healers; pro­
tecting vulnerable people from indifference, prejudice, and 
psychological and financial pressure to end their lives; and avoid­
ing a possible slide towards euthanasia ....86 
Based on the interest in preventing suicide, the Chief Justice's 
opinion attempted to use the "intent" distinction to show that a 
doctor who prescribes self-administered barbiturates to a pain-rid­
den, terminally ill patient is intending something very different 
from that which is intended by a doctor who prescribes large doses 
of morphine to a pain-ridden, terminally ill patient whose life sup­
port has just been removed.87 But when one considers the actual 
circumstances of the many terminally ill, competent persons who 
are in great pain but cannot hasten death by refusing or withdraw­
ing life support, the problem gets more complex. The Court's cau­
sation and intent distinctions seem both less helpful and less 
grounded in the realities of dying in America when one considers 
the ambiguous nature of physicians' and patients' options in end-of­
life situations. This is where Justice Breyer's concern that no state 
should prevent physicians from providing adequate pain relief­
even if that assistance actively hastens death-becomes significant. 
Justice Breyer and the other Justices whose opinions form the basis 
constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining treatment and to receive adequate palliative 
care. 
86. Quill, 521 U.S. at 808. The Court's statement about permitting everyone to 
hasten death by refusing life-sustaining medical treatment (when so many terminally ill 
persons do not have this option because they are not on life support) not only begs the 
question of the Quill case, but it also reads like Anatole France's famous line, "[T]hey 
must labour in the face of the majestic equality of the laws, which forbid rich and poor 
alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread." ANATOLE 
FRANCE, THE RED LILY 75 (Modern Library ed., 1917) (1894). 
87. As the Chief Justice put it, "[T]he law distinguishes actions taken 'because of' 
a given end from actions taken 'in spite of' their unintended but foreseen conse­
quences." Quill, 521 U.S. at 802-03 (citing Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 
U.S. 256, 279 (1979); Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 858 (9th Cir. 
1996) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting». 
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of Professor Burt's analysis have found the reality-based grey area 
in the bright-line legal distinctions that Rehnquist has drawn.88 
The problem with the Chief Justice's opinion in Quill is that it 
seems to permit the states to criminalize some forms of end-of-life 
care on the basis of distinctions of physician intent and medical cau­
sation that do not respect or reflect the realities confronted by dy­
ing patients, their families, and physicians. Rehnquist's analysis 
thereby unduly burdens the privacy and the flexibility of the doctor­
patient-family relationship.89 The potential benefit of Justice 
Breyer's opinion is that it acknowledges these realities and leaves 
open the possibility that a right to palliative care may eventually 
occupy the grey area that the Chief Justice's opinion insists is either 
black or white. The fact that Justice Breyer and others on the 
Court have been willing to recognize the realities of pain manage­
ment and of end-of-life care reinforces the view that there may be 
ways to ensure that states do not interfere unreasonably with the 
provision of palliative care and with the concomitant right to refuse 
medical treatment. Professor Burt concludes his analysis by observ­
ing that 
[l]aws restricting the appropriate availability of drugs are, 
moreover, not the only aspect of state actions that obstruct ade­
quate palliative care. As the Institute of Medicine report found, 
there are other obstructions, such as "mechanisms for financing 
care [that] impede good end-of-life care ...." If state legisla­
tures refused to address such obstructive elements of their laws, 
or gave them only perfunctory attention, they would be guilty (in 
Justice Souter's words) of "legislative foot-dragging," .... Such 
88. There is no need to deny the real differences (between permitting the refusal 
of life-sustaining medical treatment and legalizing physician-assisted suicide) in arguing 
that there is a grey area in which the Court's distinctions do not in fact constitute real 
differences. The problem is difficult for physicians and for medical ethics as well. See 
Cohen et aI., supra note 82. It is a problem of the relationship of doctor, patient, and 
family in each unique situation, not a problem of public policy. An interesting and 
provocative reflection on the limits of legal rule-making and the benefits of common 
law decision-making in this area can be found in the book Limits: The Role of Law in 
Bioethical Decision Making. ROGER B. DWORKIN, LIMITS: THE ROLE OF LAW IN 
BIOETHICAL DECISION MAKING (1996). 
89. The burden is "undue" because there are other ways to prevent abuses in the 
provision of adequate pain relief or terminal sedation. Oregon's experience seems to 
indicate that careful regulation, respectful of patient-doctor privacy, can keep even phy­
sician-assisted suicide from becoming abusive-see Oregon's Death with Dignity Act 
and the reports of its use since it took effect. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (West 2006); 
see, e.g., OR. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT ON OREGON'S 
DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT (2006), available at http://www.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/pas/ 
docs/year8.pdf. 
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states would (in Justice Breyer's words) "infringe directly upon 
... the core of the interest in dying with dignity," which involves 
"medical assistance, and the avoidance of unnecessary and severe 
physical suffering."90 
It is more than simply ironic that such perceptions about the 
realities of end-of-life care, and about the nature of the liberty 
rights that are therein implicated, should be met over the decade 
since Glucksberg and Quill with a wholesale attack upon both the 
right to refuse medical treatment and the provision of adequate pal­
liative care.91 It may be that these attacks are a strategic political, 
cultural, and legal response to Cruzan, Glucksberg, and Quill. Per­
haps because these cases provide only tenuous protections for con­
stitutional rights of autonomy for the terminally ill, they present 
weaknesses that the opponents of these principles may be able to 
exploit. And perhaps because these cases also suggest that patients, 
families, and physicians might require constitutional protections in 
end-of-life decision-making, the opponents of autonomy may feel 
compelled to undercut the medical, ethical, and legal consensus 
about end-of-life care that has existed for over twenty-five years. 
IV. THE ArrACK ON THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT AND 
ON THE PROVISION OF PALLIATIVE CARE 
There are four main areas in which political, legal, or ideologi­
cal action threatens to undermine the right to refuse unwanted 
medical treatment and the provision of adequate palliative care. 
These are: (A) proposals of state laws that restrict the right to re­
fuse treatment, (B) federal attempts to supplant state and profes­
sional judgments about what constitutes good medical practice, (C) 
criminal or professional charges brought against physicians and 
nurses engaged in palliative care, and (D) attempts to undermine 
the autonomy principle in end-of-life care. 
In each of these areas, the effort is to influence or create gov­
ernment policies such that they enact the preferences of one view of 
end-of-life care-or of life itself-to the exclusion of virtually all 
others. No doubt many of these efforts are well-intentioned and 
accord with the beliefs of their proponents. One can be equally 
90. Burt, The Supreme Court Speaks, supra note 78, at 1236 (citations omitted) 
(quoting INST. OF MED., COMM. ON CARE AT TIlE END OF LIFE, ApPROACHING DEATII: 
IMPROVING CARE AT TIlE END OF LIFE Recommendation 3(6) (1997); Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 788, 792 (1997)). 
91. At the same time, there has been a high-level effort to upend the one state 
law that legalizes and regulates physician-assisted suicide. See infra Part IV. 
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confident that at least at the political level, many of these efforts 
are engaged in with a blind certainty unconcerned about the com­
plex realities faced by millions of American families. One result 
has been an increasing polarization, both of the public discourse 
and of end-of-life issues themselves. Another has been the weaken­
ing of the legal protections for the rights that most Americans have 
come to expect as part of the decades-old consensus about individ­
ual decision-making in medical care. Still another has been the 
politicizing of the doctor-patient relationship and the practice of 
medicine itself. It is not necessary to discredit the proponents' mo­
tives in order to see how destructive these actions are in their ef­
fects. At the close of his dissent in Cruzan, Justice Brennan 
recalled this principle as articulated by Justice Louis Brandeis: "Ex­
perience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty 
when the government's purposes are beneficent. . . . The greatest 
dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, 
well meaning but without understanding. "92 
A. 	 Proposing State Laws that Restrict the Right to Refuse 
Treatment 
The National Right to Life Committee (NRLC) has drafted a 
bill entitled "Model Starvation and Dehydration of Persons with 
Disabilities Prevention Act,"93 that would prohibit any surrogate, 
guardian, public agency, or court from discontinuing artificial nutri­
tion and hydration for a non-competent medical patient except, "If 
the person executed a directive in accordance with [state advance 
directive statute] specifically authorizing the withholding or with­
drawal of nutrition and/or hydration, to the extent the authorization 
applies. "94 In addition to establishing a presumption against a ter­
mination of this form of life support for the 80 percent of Ameri­
cans who do not have advance directives, the bill empowers states 
to completely outlaw the termination of artificial feeding and hydra­
tion by adopting laws such as Missouri's that prevent advance direc­
92. Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 330 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissent­
ing) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) ). 
93. NAT'L RIGHT TO LIFE COMM., MODEL STARVATION & DEHYDRATION OF 
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (2006), available at http://www.nrlc.orgleuthanasia/ 
MODELN&HStateLaw.pdf [hereinafter MODEL STARVATION & DEHYDRATION OF 
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES ACT]. 
94. Id. § 4B. Section 4A also provides an exception if the feeding and hydration 
would not sustain life or would cause discomfort to the patient. 
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tives from controlling such termination.95 The model bill also 
empowers a wide range of persons (including certain public offi­
cials, many relatives, and even a patient's former healthcare provid­
ers) to bring a civil action for an injunction preventing the removal 
of this form of life support, 
against any person who is reasonably believed to be about to vio­
late or who is in the course of violating this act, or to secure a 
court determination, notwithstanding the position of a guardian 
or surrogate, whether there is clear and convincing evidence that 
the person legally incapable of making health care decisions, 
when legally capable of making such decisions, gave express and 
informed consent to withdrawing or withholding hydration or nu­
trition ....96 
During the pendency of such a civil suit, the model bill would re­
quire that the court direct that the artificial feeding and hydration 
be maintained. The effect of adopting this model bill could be to 
nearly completely block the termination of this form of life support. 
If such a bill affecting artificial feeding and hydration can pass and 
be found not to violate Cruzan,97 the door would be open to laws 
preventing the refusal of other life-sustaining medical treatments. 
The drafting and publication of the NRLC Model Act, 
amended in January 2006, has not been an academic exercise. 
Twenty-three states have seen bills based on or similar to the 
NRLC Model Act introduced as of February 2006.98 Many of these 
have languished in committee or been rejected, but the effort to 
95. See supra note 20. 
96. MODEL STARVATION & DEHYDRATION OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES Aer, 
supra note 93, § SA. 
97. There is the general problem of the weakness of Cruzan's constitutional hold­
ing. Moreover, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Cruzan specifically finds that, 
and explains why, artificial feeding and hydration was held to be medical treatment. 
The State's artificial provision of nutrition and hydration implicates identical 
concerns. Artificial feeding cannot readily be distinguished from other forms 
of medical treatment. Whether or not the techniques used to pass food and 
water into the patient's alimentary tract are termed "medical treatment," it is 
clear they all involve some degree of intrusion and restraint. 
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Medicalorgani­
zations seem to agree, but some religious organizations and leaders, including the Pope, 
have declared that artificial feeding and hydration cannot be considered medical 
treatment. 
98. MERGERWATCH, FAer SHEET: How RELIGIOUS CONSERVATIVES ARE TRY­
ING TO LEGISLATE AWAY YOUR END-OF-LIFE CHOICES 1 (2006), available at http:// 
mergerwatch.orglpdfs/fs_eoUegislation.pdf; see also Compassion & Choices, Improv­
ing Laws: In Legislatures, http://www.compassionandchoices.orglimprovinglaws/state 
houses.php (last visited Jan. 24, 2007) (listing legislative efforts in various states). 
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have them adopted has not waned. Three states-New York, Kan­
sas, and Wisconsin-have considered even more restrictive end-of­
life care bills that would be particularly threatening to the right to 
refuse treatment. While none of these has succeeded, aspects of 
their contents serve to illustrate the intensity of some special inter­
est group opposition to the right to refuse treatment. 
In New York, Assembly Bill 7911, introduced in May of 2005, 
would have required "trial by jury for decisions by a health care 
agent that would result in the death of an individual" except where 
a valid, written living will was in existence.99 The standard of proof 
in the required jury trial would have been "clear and convincing 
evidence. "100 The bill was referred to the Committee on Health 
and apparently died there. lOl But the idea of submitting decisions, 
such as those made by the Cruzan family, to a public trial by jury 
would increase, unconscionably, the delays and suffering endured 
by families and patients, and would turn a family tragedy into even 
more of a media platform for the culture wars.102 
In Kansas, House Bill 2307 was introduced in February of 
2005.103 An extensive revision of the state's law regarding the pow­
ers and obligations of guardians, the proposal would have denied a 
guardian the power, inter alia, to consent on behalf of the ward "to 
the withholding or withdrawal of life-saving or life-sustaining medi­
cal care, treatment, services or procedures" except "when the 
guardian can prove beyond a reasonable doubt the ward's intent, 
after full informed consent, to withhold or withdraw" such care at a 
jury trial. l04 Justice Brennan pointed out the asymmetrical nature 
of Missouri's "clear and convincing evidence" rule of decision in 
99. A. 7911, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005), available at 2005 N.Y. A.B. 7911 
(Lexis). 
100. Id. 
101. See COMPASSION & CHOICES, COMPASSION CHOICES (2005), http://www. 
compassionandchoices.org/pdfs/HealthCare_Restrictions.pdf. The information for this 
contention has been supplemented for New York by the author. Telephone Interview 
with a member of the Public Information Office of the New York State Legislature, in 
Albany, N.Y. (Sept. 6, 2006). 
102. A set of standards for termination of artificial feeding and hydration in New 
York is now contained in the text of A. 5406-B, the Health Care Decision Act (HCDA) 
that has been under consideration for several years in the New York legislature. A. 
5406-B 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005), available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/ 
?bn=A05406&sh=t. 
103. H.B. 2307, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2005), available at http://www. 
kslegisla ture .orglbills/2006/2307 . pdf. 
104. Id. 
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Cruzan.1°5 But by requiring that proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
be provided at a jury trial, the Kansas proposal was so much more 
lopsided than Cruzan that it amounted to a virtual ban on the use 
of advance directives of any kind to carry out the will of a patient 
expressed when he or she was competent. This bill died in the Judi­
ciary Committee, but it expresses a common insistence on virtual 
certainty in an area that is by its very nature characterized by am­
bivalence, ambiguity, emotional conflict, and spiritual searching.106 
In Wisconsin, Assembly Bill 207 would have expanded the cir­
cumstances in which a healthcare provider would be protected 
against "employment discrimination" or any other legal conse­
quences for refusing on grounds of "religious or moral belief or 
conscience" to participate in "[i]ntentionally causing the death of 
an individual who is not in a terminal condition, as defined in 
§ 154.01(8), by withholding or withdrawing nutrition or hydration," 
or "[a]n act that intentionally causes or assists in causing the death 
of an individual by assisted suicide, euthanasia, or mercy killing."lo7 
The bill, which would have virtually eliminated the right to refuse 
treatment and the provision of palliative care by making every 
healthcare worker the personal arbiter of a patient's medical treat­
ment, passed in the Wisconsin legislature and was sent to the Gov­
ernor in October 2005. Governor James Doyle vetoed Assembly 
Bill 207, saying, 
This bill lets your doctor put his or her political beliefs ahead of 
your medical best interests. That is simply unconscionable. 
Medical decisions should be made by the patient and the doctor 
based on what's best for the patient, not on the doctor's political 
105. See supra text accompanying notes 59-62. 
106. In an article seeking to justify congressional intervention in the Schiavo case, 
Steven Calabresi made the argument that the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard 
should be used in any case involving the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical 
treatment: 
Cruzan's holding that Missouri was within its rights to require clear and con­
vincing evidence before an incompetent's hydration and nutrition is with­
drawn, in a case where clear and convincing evidence of a desire to die was not 
found, does not establish that the clear and convincing evidence standard is 
the right standard to use in these sorts of cases. We are dealing here with 
court orders that many Americans believe involve the ending of life. Ordina­
rily, in end-of-life cases such as those involving heinous murderers convicted 
of heinous crimes, we demand proof beyond a reasonable doubt before life 
may be ended .... 
Calabresi, supra note 58, at 165. 
107. A.B. 207, 2005-2006 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2005), available at http:// 
www.legis.state.wi.us/2005/datal AB-207. pdf. 
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views.... This bill doesn't even require health care providers to 
give you a referral to someone else if they object to a particular 
treatment. ... 
Because it puts a doctor's political views ahead of the best 
interests of patients, this bill ought to be called the "unconscion­
able clause."108 
B. 	 FederaL Attempts to SuppLant State and ProfessionaL 
Judgments about What Constitutes Good MedicaL 
Practice 
Beginning in 1997, the federal government made several at­
tempts to use the Controlled Substances Act (CSA)109 to overturn 
Oregon's physician-assisted suicide law, which had twice been ap­
proved by the voters of Oregon and which remained free of consti­
tutional condemnation as anticipated by the Court's ruling in 
GLucksberg.110 The method chosen to overturn the Oregon law 
each time, however, involved casting a chill over the practice of pal­
liative care medicine (and therefore also over the right to refuse 
life-sustaining medical treatment) throughout the nation. In 1997, 
certain members of Congress requested that Attorney General Ja­
net Reno use her powers under the CSA to revoke the license to 
prescribe Schedule II opiates of any physician assisting suicide, 
even under the Oregon Death with Dignity Act.111 Attorney Gen­
eral Reno concluded that the CSA did not grant her that power, 
and in 1998, and again in 1999, legislation was introduced in Con­
gress that would have granted the Attorney General the power to 
make judgments about the intent of doctors prescribing Schedule II 
drugs. The 1998 proposal, House Bill 4006,112 was entitled the "Le­
thal Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 1998." The 1999 version of the 
108. Executive Vetoes of Bills Passed by the 2005 Wisconsin Legislature from Janu­
ary 3, 2005 to May 30, 2006 (Brief 06-9), WIS. BRIEFS (Wis. Leg. Reference Bureau, 
Madison, Wis.), May 2006, at 21, available at http://www.legis.state.wi.us/LRB/pubs/wb/ 
06wb9.pdf. 
109. 	 21 U.S.c. §§ 801-971 (2000). 
110. "Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound 
debate about the morality, legality and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our 
holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society." Washing­
ton v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997). 
111. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-.995 (2005); see also Gonzales v. Oregon 126 S. 
Ct. 904, 913 (2006). 
112. 	 H.R. 4006, 105th Congo (1998). 
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same proposal, HR 2260,113 was entitled the "Pain Relief Promo­
tion Act of 1999." Neither passed, and in November 2001, Attor­
ney General John Ashcroft issued an Interpretive Rule that stated, 
[A]ssisting suicide is not a "legitimate medical purpose" within 
the meaning of 21 c.F.R. § 1306.04 (2001), and ... prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering federally controlled substances to 
assist suicide violates the Controlled Substances Act. Such con­
duct by a physician registered to dispense controlled substances 
may "render his registration ... inconsistent with the public in­
terest," and therefore subject to possible suspension or revoca­
tion under 21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(4).114 
By issuing such a broad rule, the Attorney General was not 
only claiming the power under the CSA to judge the intentions of 
physicians in Oregon who might be working within the regulations 
imposed by the state's Death with Dignity Act,11S he was also open­
ing the possibility that the Drug Enforcement Agency could investi­
gate the intentions of any doctor in the nation who prescribed 
Schedule II medications for pain management.116 The State of Ore­
gon challenged this assertion of federal power over its regulation of 
the practice of medicine, arguing that the CSA did not give the At­
torney General the power he claimed. In hearing the case of Ore­
gon v. AshcroJt,117 the federal district court considered numerous 
amicus briefs from medical organizations, ethicists, and professors 
arguing that the rule would have a chilling effect nationally. One 
brief, filed by a "Group of Physicians, Attorneys, and Professors 
Working in Medical Ethics," on the appeal to the Ninth Circuit 
stated, 
[M]any states now, by statute, permit doctors to prescribe seda­
tion sufficient to ensure that a terminally ill patient does not feel 
pain or experience suffering, even if there is a risk that enough 
medication to quell the pain or suffering will also be lethal. The 
expansive powers claimed by the Attorney General would permit 
him to conclude that such uses of controlled substances are 
113. H.R. 2260, 106th Congo (1999). 
114. Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607 
(Interpretive Rule, Nov. 9, 2001). 
115. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-.995. 
116. See generally Timothy E. Quill & Diane E. Meier, The Big Chill-Inserting 
the DEA into End-of-Life Care, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1 (2006). 
117. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (D. Or. 2002), affd sub nom., 
Gonzalez v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006). 
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outside of "the course of professional practice" or do not serve a 
"legitimate medical purpose," .... 
Controlled substances are also commonly prescribed to re­
lieve pain in terminally ill patients who have chosen to refuse 
further life-sustaining care. If the Attorney General opposes 
such a patient's right to refuse care, as his filing in the Schiavo 
case suggests, he could effectively prevent the exercise of this 
right by threatening to revoke the license of any physician pre­
scribing controlled substances to ease the pain of a patient who 
rejects further life-sustaining support.lls 
The district court ruled against the Attorney General, and the 
ruling was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit.119 In January 2006, the 
Supreme Court affirmed 6-3 on the narrow ground that the CSA 
did not give the U.S. Attorney General the power he had 
claimed.120 The Court did not directly address the contention of 
several amici concerned about a national chilling effect on the prac­
tice of palliative care medicine or on the right to refuse life-sus­
taining medical treatment. Moreover, the Court did not use the 
case as an opportunity to expand on the suggestions contained in 
many of the Glucksberg opinions that any state action that unduly 
burdened a terminally ill patient's right to get adequate pain relief 
(such as that of Attorney General Ashcroft in 2001) might raise the 
possibility of finding a constitutional right to palliative care. The 
Court's only statement in this area was, 
Under the Government's theory, moreover, the medical 
judgments the Attorney General could make are not limited to 
physician-assisted suicide. Were this argument accepted, he 
could decide whether any particular drug may be used for any 
particular purpose, or indeed whether a physician who adminis­
ters any controversial treatment could be deregistered.121 
Because the Court chose the statutory grounds for its ruling, 
did not reinforce the constitutional right to refuse medical treat­
ment, and did not even make reference to the constitutional conse­
quences of federal or state actions that deny access to palliative 
care, it left open the possibility of amending the CSA, as had been 
tried in 1998 and 1999. On August 3, 2006, Senator Sam Brown­
118. Brief for Margaret P. Battin et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respon­
dents, at 25-26, Gonzales v. Oregon, 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 04-623) (cita­
tions omitted), available at http://www.cfidc.orgllegal/or.pdf. 
119. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004). 
120. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. 904. 
121. Id. at 921. 
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back of Kansas introduced the Assisted Suicide Prevention Act of 
2006 to do just that.122 The bill acknowledged that "[ a]lleviating 
pain or discomfort in the usual course of professional practice is a 
legitimate medical purpose for the dispensing, distributing, or ad­
ministering of a controlled substance that is consistent with public 
health and safety, even if the use of such substance may increase 
the risk of death."123 But it also empowers the Attorney General to 
prove "by clear and convincing evidence that the intent of the prac­
titioner was to dispense, distribute, or administer a controlled sub­
stance for the purpose of assisting suicide or causing the death of a 
person."124 Thus the weakness of Cruzan's constitutional holding 
and the failure of the Court in Glucksberg, Quill, and Oregon v. 
Gonzales to strengthen the autonomy principle in medical care has 
left open yet another front for the continuing attack on the right to 
refuse treatment and on the provision of palliative care. 
C. 	 Criminal or Professional Charges Brought Against Physicians 
and Nurses Engaged in Palliative Care 
In a 1998 article, Criminal Act or Palliative Care: Prosecutions 
Involving the Care of the Dying, it was reported that a search of 
national databases uncovered a very small number of indictments 
of physicians for homicide in connection with providing end-of-life 
care.125 The number of such indictments over a fifty-five year pe­
riod from 1935 to 1990 was ten; but the pace increased considerably 
in the seven years between 1990 and 1997, when there were seven 
indictments.126 Still, the small absolute number seems inconsistent 
with the anecdotal reports of several physicians and medical re­
searchers, and even a small number of convictions could be having 
a significant negative impact on the practice of palliative care 
medicine. A study was therefore initiated in 2006 to determine not 
only the current prevalence of prosecutions of doctors and nurses 
engaged in palliative care of the terminally ill, but also the condi­
122. S. 3788, 109th Congo (2006). On September 7, 2006, Senator Ron Wyden of 
Oregon put a "hold" on the bill, an action that requires sixty Senators to agree to bring 
it to a vote in the Senate. 152 CONGo REc. S8920 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 2006) (statement of 
Sen. Wyden). 
123. 	 S. 3788, § 3(2). 
124. 	 Id. § 4(i)(4). 
125. Ann Alpers, Criminal Act or Palliative Care: Prosecutions Involving the Care 
of the Dying, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 308,311 (1998). 
126. 	 Id. 
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tions that may have led to those prosecutions.127 The results of the 
study are at least a year away. But one example of such a case, 
drawn from publicly available legal literature and media coverage, 
illustrates how ideological and political attacks on end-of-life care 
options can create an atmosphere in which healthcare providers are 
at risk, constitutional rights to refuse treatment become ever more 
tenuous, and the ability to get access to adequate palliative care is 
reduced. At the core of all of these problems is the threat posed by 
the growing politicization of health care to the privacy of the doctor­
patient-family relationship and to the integrity of the medical 
profession. 
In January 1996, a Kansas physician, Dr. L. Stanley Naramore, 
was convicted in a jury trial of the attempted murder of one of his 
patients and of the malicious second-degree murder of another of 
his patients in 1992,128 Dr. Naramore provided palliative care to 
the first patient, who was suffering from end-stage cancer and was 
in extreme pain. He had participated in the termination of resusci­
tation efforts on the second, an actively dying patient. Dr. 
Naramore was sentenced to serve five to twenty years in a maxi­
mum security prison, and was paroled after serving six months.129 
He lost his license to practice and his reputation; he could not main­
tain his family or his finances, and he could find no job. In July 
1998, the Kansas Court of Appeals reversed both of Naramore's 
convictions and took the very unusual step of totally exonerating 
him by directing a verdict of acquittal.130 
A number of things about the events that led up to and fol­
lowed the indictments remain unclear and were not dealt with by 
the Kansas Court of Appeals. It appears that the family of the first 
patient gave consent to the palliative treatment after a thorough 
127. The study, funded by the Greenwall Foundation, is entitled End of Life 
Care: Healthcare Professionals and Subject Deaths, and is described in an article by 
Lewis Cohen et aI., in the Journal of Palliative Medicine, as being focused on 
medical and nursing staff who have been targeted and exonerated. We believe 
the prevalence of such allegations needs to be determined, a more complete 
understanding of the medical, social, and legal circumstances surrounding ac­
cusations should be reached, and the bioethical issues underlying end-of-Iife 
care warrant further examination. We hope to discover whether there are spe­
cific risk management strategies, public policies, or legal initiatives that can be 
used to meet this challenge. 
Cohen et aI., supra note 82, at 1102-03. 
128. Kansas v. Naramore, 965 P.2d 211 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998). 
129. Id. at 213. 
130. The Kansas Supreme Court denied review. Kansas v. Naramore, 266 Kan. 
1114 (1998). 
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discussion with Dr. Naramore in the hospital chapel, but it also ap­
pears that the son of the patient changed his mind after much of the 
pain medication had been given.l31 There were some suggestions 
that the hospital administrator had been hostile to the doctor and 
had played some role in convincing the families to turn against 
him.132 It is unclear why the local prosecutor went ahead with the 
prosecutions without first exploring the standards of medical care 
observed by Kansas physicians in similar cases. There were also 
allegations of jury misconduct contained in Naramore's appeal, and 
there was a claim that the trial judge should have granted a change 
of venue from the very small Kansas town in which Naramore prac­
ticed and from which the jurors were drawn.B3 Neither of these 
last two issues was reached by the Court of Appeals. 
What does seem clear from the available facts is that the use of 
the criminal process (in two medical cases involving the most com­
plicated and emotionally difficult decisions that families and physi­
cians ever have to make) is at least partially responsible for this 
miscarriage of justice. Under these circumstances, an atmosphere 
was created in which the jury was allowed to ignore accepted stan­
dards of good medical practice and make the defendant a lightning 
rod for the grief and anger that many people feel in the face of 
death. Personal beliefs and ideologies appear to have taken prece­
dence over careful consideration of the facts and application of le­
gally appropriate standards of judgment. 
There was voluminous expert testimony in the case. The Court 
of Appeals had the benefit of several amicus briefs from physicians 
and medical associations, and at trial three physicians testified for 
the state and six for the defense.134 The convictions were reversed, 
and the acquittal ordered, on the basis of legal insufficiency of evi­
dence (and with the implication that the defendant had been 
railroaded) .135 
We have made a thorough review of the record, which in­
cludes a wealth of undisputed evidence and expert medical testi­
mony. We find that no rational jury could find criminal intent 
131. Naramore, 965 P.2d at 212, 215. A documentary about the case, hosted by 
Bill Kurtis, was aired by the A&E Television Networks, and pointed to some of these 
unresolved questions. American Justice: A Questionable Doctor (A&E television 
broadcast Mar. 5, 2003) [hereinafter A Questionable Doctor]. 
132. A Questionable Doctor, supra note 131. 
133. See Naramore, 965 P.2d at 224. 
134. Id. at 219-21; see A Questionable Doctor, supra note 131. 
135. Naramore, 965 P.2d at 224. 
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and guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on the record here. 
When the issue is whether there is reasonable doubt, a jury is not 
free to disbelieve undisputed facts. What occurred here is gener­
ally known. The jury was not free to disbelieve that there was 
substantial competent medical opinion in support of the proposi­
tion that Dr. Naramore's actions were not only noncriminal, but 
were medically appropriate.136 
The court further hinted at the problem of politicizing health­
care and the practice of medicine by observing that if it had upheld 
a jury verdict based on ignoring an "authoritative medical consen­
sus," it would have "criminalized malpractice and even the possibil­
ity of malpractice. "137 In a dissent, the Chief Judge of the Court of 
Appeals agreed that the verdicts should be reversed, but would 
have sent the case back for retrial based on adequate instructions to 
the jury. The dissent makes clear the role that the law ought to play 
in protecting the provision of quality healthcare to individual pa­
tients in a time of public passions and political machinations about 
end-of-life care. 
However, unlike the civil Pattern Jury Instructions provided 
in medical and professional malpractice cases, there are no crimi­
nal Pattern Jury Instructions relating to the medical and moral 
responsibilities of care givers for the critically or terminally ill 
patient, nor are there legislatively created screening panels. If 
care givers are now to be faced with the specter of criminal pros­
ecution in these kinds of cases, then the legislature may want to 
consider requiring the appointment of panels similar to those 
used for medical malpractice cases prior to the filing of criminal 
charges. 
. . . At the very least, in the present case, the jury should 
have been instructed on the physician's duty and standard of care 
when treating a terminal cancer patient for pain and the recog­
nized standard of care and measures to be taken in attempting to 
save a [dying] patient. . .. Since they were not so instructed, it is 
impossible to determine whether the jury made an assessment of 
Naramore's actions, taking into consideration his role as a 
physician.138 
The case of Dr. Stan Naramore-like the attempt of Attorney 
General Ashcroft to control the practice of medicine in the states, 
and like the ongoing state efforts to restrict the right to refuse medi­
136. Id. at 223. 
137. Id. at 224. 
138. Id. at 225 (Brazil, J., dissenting). 
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cal treatment-illustrates how the natural anguish that accompa­
nies the death of a loved one, and the unnatural pressures that are 
sometimes brought to bear by interest groups bent on imposing 
their own sincerely held morals on everyone, can cast a pall over 
the practice of palliative medicine and hobble the end-of-life care 
that we are all someday likely to need. 
D. 	 Attempts to Undermine the Autonomy Principle in End-of­
Life Care 
In a 2005 report by the President's Council on Bioethics, the 
following statement was made in a chapter entitled, The Limited 
Wisdom of Advance Directives, as part of an argument that the au­
tonomy principle should be restricted or abandoned in end-of-life 
care: 
Not only are living wills unlikely to achieve their own stated 
goals, but those goals themselves are open to question. Living 
wills make autonomy and self-determination the primary values 
at a time of life when one is no longer autonomous or self-deter­
mining, and when what one needs is loyal and loving care.139 
The report goes on to praise the usefulness of proxy directives, 
since proxies "serve the wise and helpful purpose" of providing care 
and making medical decisions on the basis of the explicit instruc­
tions they have been given. But the report concludes that one can 
never know one's needs in advance and must therefore rely on deci­
sions made at the time by loved ones. The report praises the direc­
tive a patient might give a proxy and the role of the proxy as 
caregiver and participant in making decisions for patients who have 
become unable to make their own. But, unlike Justice O'Connor's 
opinion in Cruzan, the report does not suggest that the health care 
proxy's decisions, or those of another guardian or surrogate, should 
be regarded as determinative. Justice O'Connor sees that it is lib­
139. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, TAKING CARE: ETHICAL CAREGIVING 
IN OUR AGING SOCIETY 55 (2005), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/takin~ 
care/takin~care.pdf. This report was issued by President George w. Bush's Council in 
September 2005. Not surprisingly, the Council has a strong conservative bent and 
reaches conclusions about end-of-life care and reproductive freedoms very different 
from its predecessor appointed by President Clinton. For a listing of President Bush's 
2002 appointees, see Press Release, The White House, Designation and Appointments, 
Nov. 8, 2002, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021108-6· 
htmI.SeealsoCruzanv.Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 329-30 (1990) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (Justice Brennan's use in Cruzan of a report on a similar topic written by a 
prior President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research). 
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erty at stake: "[T]he Court does not today decide the issue whether 
a State must also give effect to the decisions of a surrogate deci­
sionmaker. ... In my view, such a duty may well be constitutionally 
required to protect the patient's liberty interest in refusing medical 
treatment. "140 
In effect, if not in intent, the President's Council report lays a 
philosophical and policy foundation for diminishing the constitu­
tional importance of the liberty interest that the Cruzan Court was 
at least reluctantly willing to articulate. In doing this, the report 
relies heavily on an article published in 2004 by the Hastings 
Center, Enough: The Failure of the Living Will.141 The Hastings 
article takes, among others, an economic view of the value of indi­
vidual liberty in end-of-life care decisions. The authors claim that 
"[i]n an attempt to extend patients' exercise of autonomy beyond 
their span of competence, resources have been lavished to make 
living wills routine and even universal. This policy has not pro­
duced results that recompense its costs, and it should therefore be 
renounced. "142 
There are, of course, practical problems with advance direc­
tives just as there are problems with medical decisions made for 
those who come to the last stages of their lives without having left 
any instructions or appointed any proxies to carry out their treat­
ment wishes and look after their welfare. One of these problems, 
referred to in both the President's Council report and the Hastings 
article, is that only about 20 percent of Americans execute advance 
directives of any sort.143 Some commentators have lamented the 
low rate of adopting advance directives and the psychological and 
philosophical dilemmas of a competent person's deciding what he 
or she will value when no longer competent. These problems are 
140. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 289 (O'Connor, l., concurring). 
141. Angela Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider, Enough: The Failure of the Living 
Will, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 30, 31, available at http://www. 
thehastingscenter.org/pdf/publications/Hcr_Mar_Apr_2004_Enough.pdf. 
142. Id. at 31. 
143. The well-known SUPPORT study provided resources that might have in­
creased the percentage of people with advance directives, but to no avail. A Controlled 
Trial to Improve Care for Seriously III Hospitalized Patients: The Study to Understand 
Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatments (SUPPORT), 274 
lAMA 1591, 1591 (1995); see also PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 
139, at 55 (concluding that advance directives will not solve societal problems related to 
care decisions because only a minority of Americans create them); Fagerlin & Schnei­
der, supra note 141, at 32 (noting that "without considerable intervention approxi­
mately 20 percent" of people complete living wills). 
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then cited to justify declaring not only advance directives but also 
the autonomy principle itself to be on life support. 
In a 1998 book, The Practice of Autonomy: Patients, Doctors, 
and Medical Decisions,144 law professor and physician Carl Schnei­
der suggests that the autonomy principle at the end of life is an 
empirically ineffective expression of hyper-rationalism. Schneider 
argues that the evidence of actual end-of-life decision-making 
points to the fact that in many circumstances physicians are likely to 
make better decisions than severely ill patients who want only to be 
taken care of competently. But in a review of the book, Professor 
George Annas takes issue with Schneider's assessment of how to 
approach the role of autonomy: 
I am with those who believe, unlike Schneider, that patients con­
tinue to have too little, not too much, autonomy .... I agree ... 
that more is at stake than just autonomy and that many choices 
patients have are illusory and hollow. The central question is not 
whether patient autonomy should be taken seriously: liberty is a 
basic human right and is nowhere potentially more compromised 
than when we are sick. The question is how we can build a medi­
cal care system that routinely respects human rights and human 
dignity as the fundamental constituents of life.145 
The consequences of the medical and legal debate over auton­
omy are far-reaching. In an article entitled The End of Autonomy, 
Professor Robert Burt concludes that the difficulty of being rational 
about what is essentially irrational (one's own death), and the im­
portance (to patients, families, physicians, and public policy) of 
maintaining an ambivalent attitude about end-of-life decisions, both 
support the policy conclusion that an entirely new path should be 
chosen for regUlating end-of-life decisions. 
Death is more than a future condition with uncertain benefits 
and detriments. It is more than the absence of life. It is the ab­
sence, the intrinsic contradiction, of meaningfulness. The very 
concept of the choice-making self, the construct on which the au­
tonomy principle depends for its coherence, is radically unset­
144. CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY: PATIENTS, DOCTORS, 
AND MEDICAL DECISIONS (1998). 
145. George l. Annas, Book Review, 283 lAMA 930, 930-31 (2000) (reviewing 
CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY: PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND MEDI­
CAL DECISIONS, supra note 144). 
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tied-even made incomprehensible-by the actual, imminent 
approach of death.146 
The President's Council report and the other policy and schol­
arly explorations raise interesting philosophical issues and policy 
problems, but viewed in the context of current law and of political 
struggle over end-of-life care, they are very problematic. To say, 
for example, that living wills or other explicit advance directives 
lack validity because they are used when a person is no longer au­
tonomous is to deny, in effect, the personhood of the maker of the 
living will. The whole idea of an advance directive is to preserve 
one's dignity, one's values, and one's liberty into a time when they 
are dwindling-to use one's capacities while they are fully func­
tional to plan for a time when they are not. There are, of course, 
many changes of mind, unforeseeable circumstances, and new de­
velopments that might influence how an advance directive would be 
used or how a surrogate might evaluate a patient's previous expres­
sions of will. But the difficulty of so doing is part of the human 
condition, part of the mystery and the anguish of end-of-life deci­
sion-making. These realities cannot be banished by any formula for 
care of the terminally ill or any regime of decision-making about 
dying; and the attempt to do so can only reduce the personhood,147 
which advance directives in particular, and the autonomy principle 
in general, are meant to preserve. 
There are two other basic problems with these subtle and not­
so-subtle attacks on the autonomy principle. First, one has to con­
sider the alternatives to the present tenuous regime of constitu­
tionallaw. The President's Council report, for example, praises the 
role of family and of loved ones in making end-of-life decisions. 
But the reality of healthcare politics-as illustrated by culture wars 
fought over the right to refuse treatment-is that the state or some 
146. Robert A. Burt, The End of Autonomy, in HASTINGS ern., supra note 2, at 
S9, S10. Burt offers three "countervailing schemes" for the social regulation of end-of­
life care designed, he claims, to avoid the "malign dynamic" that prevails now and that 
prevailed before the advent of the autonomy principle. Id. at SI1. For another deeply 
humane but equally dark discussion of the philosophical and psychological realities of 
our ambivalence toward death, see ROBERT A. BURT, DEATH IS THAT MAN TAKING 
NAMES: INTERSECTIONS OF AMERICAN MEDICINE, LAW AND CULTURE (2002). See also 
Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 351 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting); supra 
text accompanying note 42. 
147. Justice Stevens' observation in Cruzan is apposite: "To deny the importance 
of ... [what Nancy Cruzan loses by having medical treatment continued against her 
wishes] is in effect to deny that Nancy Cruzan has interests at all, and thereby to deny 
her personhood in the name of preserving the sanctity of her life." Cruzan, 497 U.S. 
261, 353 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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interest group, and not the family, will wind up making these deci­
sions.148 To engage in philosophical debates about the nature of 
personhood, or the question of "whether the experience of old age 
with dementia will still seem valuable to a future self"149 may mask 
the struggle or it may provide a comfortable haven for speculation 
about the mysteries of life; but it cannot stop the politicizing effect 
of the culture wars upon end-of-life care. The realities of law and 
politics explored in this Article suggest, moreover, that de-legitimiz­
ing the autonomy principle may be the last action needed to under­
mine the medical, ethical, and legal consensus on individual liberty 
in decision-making about end-of-life care.150 
The other basic problem with the attack on the autonomy prin­
ciple is that much of this discussion is so profound. At the discus­
sion's core are questions about the meaning of life, death, and the 
nature of the Self. It is a discussion fundamental to the ways in 
which we understand our world and define our relationships to each 
other, to the state and to the spiritual plane of existence. Differ­
ences of belief and of opinion about these elements of the human 
condition are matters of conscience. As such, they are as important 
a part of individual liberty and as much deserving of constitutional 
protection as are the freedoms of religion enumerated in the First 
Amendment. It is precisely the power and depth of these compet­
ing ideas-and the conflict that inevitably ensues when government 
takes sides in the competition-that should convince us that the au­
tonomy principle is not simply useful in end-of-life care decision­
making, it is essential. Justice Stevens put the matter clearly in his 
dissent in Cruzan. 
148. As Justice O'Connor put it, "At the heart of liberty is the right to define 
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of 
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood 
were they formed under compulsion of the State." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
149. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 139, at 83. 
150. The philosophical debate is an interesting exploration of difficult problems 
of end-of-Iife care decision-making. It is easy to lose sight in these discussions of the 
fact that the United States Constitution is based upon philosophical decisions and polit­
ical theory that are grounded in the Enlightenment. It is possible that the debate over 
end-of-life issues may become not only a means to undermine the consensus on patient 
autonomy in medical care decisions, but a threat to the basis of other individual liber­
ties as well. To explore some of the philosophical debate, see Michael Quante, Prece­
dent Autonomy and Persona/Identity, 9 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 365 (1999); Rebecca 
Dresser, Dworkin on Dementia: Elegant Theory, Questionable Policy, HASTINGS CTR. 
REP., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 32, 32-38; RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGU­
MENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993). 
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Our duty, and the concomitant freedom, to come to terms with 
the conditions of our own mortality ... are essential incidents of 
the unalienable rights to life and liberty endowed us by our Crea­
tor.... [N]ot much may be said with confidence about death 
unless it is said from faith, and that alone is reason enough to 
protect the freedom to conform choices about death to individual 
conscience. We may also, however, justly assume that death is 
not life's simple opposite, or its necessary terminus, but rather its 
completion. Our ethical tradition has long regarded an apprecia­
tion of mortality as essential to understanding life's significance. 
It may, in fact, be impossible to live for anything without being 
prepared to die for something.151 
CONCLUSION 
This review of the Supreme Court cases and of some of the 
political controversies involving the right to refuse life-sustaining 
medical treatment and the provision of palliative care suggests that 
the constitutional rights and the autonomy principle at stake are 
tenuous, perhaps even unreliable. It also suggests that the ideologi­
cal and cultural attacks upon these rights are becoming strong, even 
virulent. The effect has been the politicization of end-of-life health­
care in general, and an undermining of doctor, patient, and family 
privacy and of the integrity of the medical profession in particular. 
This last-the politicization of medical practice and of the relation­
ship of doctors to their patients and their families-is a great irony. 
For among the state interests that the Court has found to be legiti­
mate and important is not only the protection of life but also the 
ethical integrity of the medical profession, with all that implies not 
only about easing suffering but also about maintaining the trust and 
privacy central to the doctor-patient relationship.152 
At the same time, there are hopeful signs for the maintenance 
and enhancement of the quality and dignity of medical care for the 
terminally ill. Several Justices of the Court have written opinions 
that indicate not only that they understand and empathize with the 
151. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 343 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
152. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997). This state interest in­
cludes the idea that the state should protect medical ethics partly in order to secure the 
conditions of trust between doctor and patient upon which the proper functioning of 
the entire healthcare enterprise depends. To politicize the relationship between pa­
tients and their doctors is hardly to support the trust upon which good decision-making 
by them depends. It appears, then, that in some cases the state has been using one 
legitimate interest-the protection of life-to undermine another legitimate state inter­
est-the effectiveness and integrity of the medical profession. 
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heartaches and struggles of families and patients faced with the 
need for palliative care, but also that they see the logic of using the 
liberty protections of the Constitution to secure individual auton­
omy, family, patient, and physician privacy and the availability of 
palliative care. Public opinion is clearly and overwhelmingly op­
posed to the meddling of government and of special interest groups 
in the private dilemmas of families such as the Cruzans and the 
Schiavos. The philosophers and advocates of medical paternalism 
and of religious hegemony are still in the minority. There is poten­
tial, therefore, to extend the protections for, and resist the attacks 
on, end-of-life care by working towards the creation of a compre­
hensive right to palliative care for the terminally ill and for those 
who refuse medical treatment. 
The creation of a right to palliative care-which might be ar­
ticulated judicially on the state or federal level or through legisla­
tion at the state level-would be a complex matter.153 Such a right 
would have to be based on the evaluation of many questions about 
end-of-life care and refusal of medical treatment like those raised 
by the cases and controversies discussed in this Article. The pro­
cess used for recommending the content of a right to palliative care 
would have to be multi-disciplinary and apolitical,154 providing 
ways to take into account the experiences of ordinary Americans 
and the many forms of professional, academic, and policy expertise 
already contained in the literature of medicine, social work, ethics, 
and law. Most important, the work would have to be undertaken 
by persons who understand that individual autonomy and doctor­
patient privacy in making end-of-life decisions are fundamental 
parts of liberty, and that this liberty must be secured against the 
politicization and polarization that has characterized so many of the 
battles in a growing culture war over death and dying in America. 
153. See supra note 2 for an outline of some of the substantive issues about the 
nature of palliative care that would have to be addressed. It might be said that the 
evaluation of the law and politics of palliative care contained in this Article begins and 
ends with an urgent call for the construction and adoption of a right to palliative care 
for the terminally ill, but that it does not prescribe in detail what such a right should 
contain. 
154. Unfortunately, experience has shown that the President's Council on 
Bioethics might not provide such an apolitical forum. See supra note 139. 
